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In Chaffin v. Brame,1 plaintiff's evidence tended to show that while
traveling at night he was partially blinded by the lights of an approach-
ing vehicle; that he reduced the speed of his automobile, and, upon
passing the approaching vehicle, observed defendant's truck parked on
the traveled portion of the highway; that plaintiff was unable to avoid
striking the truck. Defendant's motion for nonsuit, on the ground that
plaintiff's evidence showed contributory negligence as a matter of law,
was denied and an issue of contributory negligence was submitted to
the jury. The decision affirming the action of the superior court does
much to clarify the North Carolina rule of "outrunning headlights,"
apparently the source of some confusion in recent years.2
Chaffin v. Brame is the most recent of a number of cases that involve
an after-dark collision of an automobile with a parked vehicle or some
other stationary object.3 The rule of "outrunning headlights" appli-
1233 N. C. 377, 64 S. E. 2d 276 (1951).
Thomas v. Thurston Motor Lines, 230 N. C. 122, 52 S. E. 2d 377 (1949).
See Note, 27 N. C. L. REv. 153 (1948) ; Note, 29 N C. L. REv. 439, 443 (1951).
' The cases have developed along two "lines."
Those in which a nonsuit is proper: e.g., Marshall v. Southern Ry. Co., 233
N. C. 38, 62 S. E. 2d 489 (1950); Fawley v. Bobo, 231 N. C. 203, 56 S. E. 2d
419 (1950) ; Hollingsworth v. Grier, 231 N. C. 108, 55 S. E. 2d 806 (1950) (de-
murrer to complaint sustained) ; Wilson v. Central Motor Lines, 230 N. C. 551,
54 S. E. 2d 53 (1949) ; Brown v. W. B. & S. Bus Lines, 230 N. C. 493, 53 S. E.
2d 539 (1949) ; Cox v. Lee, 230 N. C. 155, 52 S. E. 2d 355 (1949) ; Parkway Bus
Co. v. Coble Dairy Products, 229 N. C. 352, 49 S. E. 2d 523 (1948); Tyson v.
Ford, 228 N. C. 778, 47 S. E. 2d 251. (1948) ; Riggs v. Gulf Oil Corp., 228 N. C.
774, 47 S. E. 2d 254 (1948) ; McKinnon v. Howard Motor Lines, 228 N. C. 132,
44 S. E. 2d 735 (1947) ; Allen v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co., 223 N. C. 118, 25 S. E.
2d 388 (1943) ; Pike v. Seymour, 222 N. C. 42, 21 S. E. 2d 884 (1942) ; Sibbett
v. R. & W. Transit Co., 220 N. C. 702, 18 S. E. 2d 203 (1942) ; Beck v. Hooks,
218 N. C. 105, 10 S. E. 2d 608 (1940); Lee v. Atlantic Coastline R. R., 212 N. C.
340, 193 S. E. 395 (1937) ; Weston v. Southern Ry., 194 N. C. 210, 139 S. E. 237(1927).
Those in which submission of an issue of contributory negligence to the jury
is proper: e.g., Thomas v. Thurston Motor Lines, 230 N. C. 122, 52 S. E. 2d 377(1949) ; Dawson v. Seashore Transportation Co., 230 N. C. 36, 51 S. E. 2d 921(1949) ; Barlow v. City Bus Lines, 229 N. C. 382, 49 S. E. 2d 793 (1948) ; Cum-
mins v. Southern Fruit Co., 225 N. C. 625, 36 S. E. 2d 11 (1945); Clarke v.
Martin, 217 N. C. 440, 8 S. E. 2d 230 (1940) ; Leonard v. Tatum Transfer Co.,
218 N. C. 667, 12 S. E. 2d 729 (1940) ; Page v. McLamb, 215 N. C. 789, 3 S. E.
2d 275 (1939) ; Clarke v. Martin, 215 N. C. 405, 2 S. E. 2d 10 (1939) ; Cole v.
Koonce, 214 N. C. 188, 198 S. E. 637 (1938) ; Lambert V. Caronna, 206 N. C. 616,
175 S. E. 303 (1934) ; Williams v. Frederickson Motor Lines, 198 N. C. 193, 151
S. E. 197 (1929).
All these cases involve collision with a stationary object. Collision with moving
object is not within the scope of this note. There is, however, in some of the
cases, a question of fact as to whether the vehicle was stopped or stopping.
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cable to these cases is usually stated as follows:
"... [A person driving at night] must operate his motor vehicle
in such manner and at such speed as will enable him to stop
within the radius of his lights." 4
The application of this standard arises where defendant moves for a
compulsory nonsuit predicated on the evidence showing contributory
negligence as a matter of law.5 Perhaps the principal obstacle to a clear
understanding of the rule is the terse statement generally accorded it.
This has tended to make it appear rigid, but in view of recent decisions, 6
this rigidity is only superficial.
Though several opinions are written in terms of each case being
decided on its own facts, 7 it is difficult to determine whether or not the
standard employed since 1927 has consistently been a flexible one of
due care. Careful study of the factual situation in each case seems to
support a conclusion that, although the statement of the rule has been
rigid, the rule as actually applied by the court has always been simply
a standard of due care.8
Whether this conclusion is accepted or not, there can be no doubt
'Cox v. Lee, 230 N. C. 155, 158, 52 S. E. 2d 355, 356 (1949), and cases there
cited.
' For usual rules as to granting of nonsuit on grounds of contributory negli-
gence, see Atkins v. White Transportation Co., 224 N. C. 688, 32 S. E. 2d 209
(1944), and cases cited there.
The question may also arise at the pleading stage, where a demurrer is filed
on the ground that contributory negligence appears on thq face of the complaint.
Hollingsworth v. Grier, 231 N. C. 108, 55 S. E. 2d 806 (1950).
' "The law simply decrees that a person operating a motor vehicle at night
must so drive that he can stop his automobile or change its course in time to avoid
collision with any obstacle or obstruction whose presence on the highway is rea-
sonably perceivable to him or reasonably expectable by him. It certainly does not
require him to see that which is invisible to a person exercising ordinary care."
Chaffin v. Brame, 233 N. C. 377, 380, 64 S. E. 2d 276, 279 (1951). ". . . the
bench and bar [have a tendency] to regard it [the rule] as a rule of thumb rather
than as an effort to express in a convenient formula for ready application to a
recurring factual situation, the basic principle that a person must exercise ordinary
care to avoid injury when he undertakes to drive a motor vehicle upon a public
highway at night." Thomas v. Thurston Motor Lines, 230 N. C. 122, 132, 52 S. E.
2d 377, 383 (1949).
'Thomas v. Thurston Motor Lines, supra note 6; Dawson v. Seashore Trans-
portation Co., 230 N. C. 36, 51 S. E. 2d 921 (1949) ; Parkway Bus Co. v. Coble
Dairy Products, 229 N. C. 352, 49 S. E. 2d 623 (1948); McKinnon v. Howard
Motor Lines, 228 N. C. 132, 44 S. E. 2d 735 (1947) ; Cole v. Koonce, 214 N. C. 188
S. E. 637 (1938).
' The only case that put a seemingly rigid rule squarely before the court in-
volved the following instruction, asked for by defendant and refused by the trial
court: "If you find . . . that the plaintiff ... could see only 10 or 15 feet in front
of his machine and that a much greater distance than 15 feet would be required to
stop his machine, then ... plaintiff would be guilty of negligence, and if, y9ou
further find ... that such negligence was either the proximate cause or one of the
proximate causes of plaintiff's injury, then ... plaintiff would be guilty of con-
tributory negligence... .' The court said the instruction or its substance, should
have been given. Clarke v. Martin, 217 N. C. 440, 441, 8 S. E. 2d 230 (1940).
It is noteworthy that in spite of this seeming approval of a rigid charge, there
vet remains elasticity in that portion of the charge dealing with proximate cause.
1951]"*
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
as to the present status of the rule. It is one of due care under the
circumstances. The elements of "outrunning headlights," i.e., the speed
of the vehicle as related to the range of the headlights and the effective-
ness of the brake mechanism, are simply considered as relatively impor-
tant factors in determining the presence or absence of contributory
negligence as a matter of law. Since the bare fact of a collision would
in most cases give rise to an inference that plaintiff was "outrunning
his headlights," it seems that the only effective means of withstanding
a demurrer or nonsuit is a careful marshalling of facts that tend to show
extenuating circumstances in the particular case. 9 Facts having a bear-
ing of importance for this purpose have been indicated by a recent
note.' 0
A comparison with the status of the rule, or its equivalent, in other
jurisdictions" indicates that the North Carolina Supreme Court has
taken a sensible approach to a -difficult problem which is of importance
to many North Carolina motorists. In the light of recent decisions, the
following statement seems to be indicative of the court's attitude toward
'oti&unning headlights":
One must operate a motor vehicle at night in a manner that will
,enable him to avoid striking objects that, by the exercise of rea-
sonable care, he should perceive or anticipate as they come within
the range of the headlights of his vehicle.
JOHN R. MONTGOMERY, JR.
Bailments-Validity of Contract Limiting Liability for Negligence
Automobile owner contracted with defendant parking lot operator
for parking privileges,' the parties agreeing orally2 that defendant would
' The situation here is similar to the doctrine enunciated by the court that, the
failure of a motorist to stop at a point where a clear view may be had of railroad
tracks before crossing them is contributory negligence as a matter of law. Parker
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 232 N. C. 472, 61 S. E. 2d 370 (1950). It is interest-
ing to note that this doctrine appeared in North Carolina in 1927, the same year
as the rule of "outrunning headlights." Harrison v. North Carolina R. R., 194 N. C.
656, 140 S. E. 598 (1927). The rigid doctrine is generally considered to be the
result of Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66 (1927). But, by the
recognition of "modifying factors," the North Carolina Court has, for most pur-
poses, transformed the doctrine into a standard of reasonable care. See Note, 29
N. C. L. REv. 301 (1951).
"Note, 27 N. C. L. REv. 153 (1948).
"See cases cited in 58 A. L. R. 1493 (1929), 87 A. L. R. 900 (1933), 97 A. L. R.
546 (1944). In many states the rule is codified in "assured clear distance" statutes.
See Rich v. Petersen Truck Lines, 357 Pa. 318, 53 A. 2d 725 (1947) ; Smiley v.
Arrow Spring Bed Co., 138 Ohio St. 81, 33 N. E. 2d 3 (1941). For an extensive
discussion of the effects of the rule of "outrunning headlights," with citations to
cases from many jurisdictions, see Comment, 34 ILL. L. REV. 65 (1940).
'The car keys were turned over to defendant so that he might move it about
the lot as necessity demanded. Distinguish from instances where the owner keeps
the car keys and is merely lessee of his parking spot. In such case there is no
[Vol. 30
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not be liable for loss by theft or fire. While parked in defendant's lot,
the automobile was stolen. In an action for the value of the automo-
bile, the agreement was allowed as a defense, and judgment was for
defendant. The North Carolina Supreme Court granted a new trial,
holding the agreement void as violating public policy. The court recog-
nized that ordinary mutual benefit bailees may make such contracts, but
refused to allow such a contract where the bailee is a professional, and
holds himself out to the public on a uniform basis.3
This -decision stands alone in North Carolina as regards professional
bailees. It is supported, however, by analogous cases involving public
service corporations.4 Also, in the early case of Hanes v. Shapiro5 it
was indicated by way of dictum that this was the policy in North Caro-
lina. Dicta in succeeding cases reaffirmed this.6
The validity of exculpatory agreements which relieve the bailee of
all liability for his own negligence has been questioned for some time.7 -
As pertains to ordinary mutual benefit bailees such contracts are gen-
erally held to be valid, if they violate no rule of public policy and if
there is no great disparity of bargaining power between the parties. 8
In recent years, the courts have differentiated between the ordinary mu-
tual benefit bailee, dealing with the public on an individual basis, and the
professional mutual benefit bailee, who deals with the public on a uni-
bailment because the lot operator acquires no dominion or control over the .car.
See Freeman v. Service Co.; 226 N. C. 736, 40 S. E. 2d 365 (1946).
-This note does not cover those cases where the exculpatory clause is pleaded
on the sole grounds that such limiting terms were displayed on signs or printed on
identification stubs. See Gwertzman, Contracts Limiting the Bailee's Liability, 299
INs. L. J. 1059 (1947) ; Note, 40 MicHr. L. REV. 897 (1942).
'Miller's Mutual Fire Insurance Assoc. v. Parker, 234 N. C. 20, 65 S. E. 2d
341 (1951).
' Slocumb v. Raleigh, C. & S. R.R., 165 N. C. 338, 81 S. E. 335 (1914) ; Single-
ton v. A. C. L. R.R., 203 N. C. 462, 166 S. E. 305 (1932). In the Singleton case
plaintiff bailor left cotton on defendant bailee's railroad station platform, not to be
shipped, and with no obligation to ship it. Plaintiff agreed that defendant was
exempt from liability for any negligent destruction. The court upheld the agree-
ment. Here the bailment was not in the performance of defendant's duties as a
common carrier, but was a special contract in which the public had no interest.
'168 N. C. 24, 29, 84 S. E. 33, 35 (1914).
' Sams v. Cochran, 188 N. C. 731, 735, 125 S. E. 626, 628 (1924) ; Cooke v.
Veneer Co., 169 N. C. 493, 494, 86 S. E. 289 (1915).
7Willis, The Right of Bailees to .Contract Against Liability for Negligence, 20
HARv. L. REv. 297 (1907) ; Notes, 40 MIcH. L. REv. 897 (1942), 86 U. PA. L. REv.
772 (1938).
8 "The parties may enlarge or diminsh their liability by special contract, pro-
vided, first, that the contract is not in violation of law or against public policy.
. anes v. Shapiro, 168 N. C. 24, 84 S. E. 33 (1914). Newport News Ship-
building & Dry Dock Co. v. United States, 34 F. 2d 100 (4th Cir.) cert. denied,
280 U. S. 599 (1929) ; Laurens v. Jenney's Inc., 770 Ohio App. 291, 66 N. E. 2d 777
(1945); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§574, 575 (1932); 6 WILLISTON. CONTRACrS,
§1751C (Rev. ed. 1938) ; Note, 175 A. L. R. 117 (1948). Some jurisdictions refuse
to allow such agreements in any case. Sporsom v. First National Bank, 133 Wash.
199, 233 Pac. 641 (1925) ; Gesford v. Star Van & Storage Co., 104 Neb. 453, 177
N. W. 794 (1920).
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form basis.9 The latter category is generally held to include parking
lots,'0 garages,"1 check rooms,' 2 and warehouses.' 3 Here, the majority
view seems to be that such an exculpatory agreement is void.14 This
is based on disparity of bargaining power,15 the public nature of the
undertaking,' 6 and, in some cases, on statutory interpretation.1 7 A
few jurisdictions take the position that such contracts do not violate any
public policy.I s Others uphold such agreements on the ground that the
' Notes, 40 MIcH. L. REv. 897, 899 (1942), 86 U. PA. L. REv. 772, 778 (1938);
Note, 175 A. L. R. 12, 112 (1948).
" Pallotta v. Hanna Parking Garage Co., 46 Ohio L. Abst. 18, 68 N. E. 2d 170
(1946) ; Note, 30 Ky. L. J. 325 (1942) ; See Notes, 131 A. L. R. 1175 (1941), 175
A. L. R. 12, 123 (1948).
" Scott Auto & Supply Co. v. McQueen, 111 Okla. 107, 226 Pac. 372 (1924);
See Note, 175 A. L. R. 12, 128 (1948).
" Denver Union Terminal R. Co. v. Culliman, 72 Colo. 248, 210 Pac. 602
(1922) ; Note, 22 MIcH. L. REv. 154 (1923) ; Note, 175 A. L. R. 12, 120 (1948).
" Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Kerr, 204 Ark. 238, 161 S. W. 2d 403 (1942);
Note, 175 A. L. R. 12, 131 (1948).
"Parking Lots: Keenan Hotel Co. v. Funks, 93 Ind. App. 677, 177 N. E. 364
(1931) ; Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Constantine, 40 Ohio L. Abst. 569, 56 N. E. 2d 687
(1943), aff'd, 144 Ohio St. 275, 58 N. E. 2d 658 (1944) ; Baione v. Heavey, 103
Pa. Super. 529, 158 At. 181 (1932).
Garages: Parris v. Jaquith, 70 Colo. 63, 197 Pac. 750 (1920); Renfroe v.
Fouche, 26 Ga. App. 340, 106 S. E. 303 (1921) ; Wienberger v. Werremeyer, 224
Ill. App. 217 (1922); Gulf & S. T. R. Co. v. Sutton Motor Co., 12 La. App. 495,
126 So. 458 (1930) ; Nagaki v. Stockfleth, 141 Neb. 676, 4 N. W. 2d 766 (1942) ;
Scott Auto & Supply Co. v. McQueen, 111 Okla. 107, 226 Pac. 372 (1924) ; Simms
v. Sullivan, 100 Or. 487, 198 Pac. 240 (1921). Where the garage charges less than
the average because of such contract, the contract may be upheld. Automobile
Underwriters of America v. Langlin, 6 La. App. 67 (1927).
Check Rooms: Denver Union Terminal R. Co. v. Culliman, 72 Colo. 248, 210
Pac. 602 (1922). In this field the courts appear more inclined to uphold such
agreements, if they are expressly made. See Note, 175 A. L. R. 12, 123 (1948).
Warehouses: Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Kerr, 204 Ark. 239, 161 S. W.
2d 408 (1942) ; England v. Lyon Fireproof Storage Co., 94 Cal. App. 562, 271
Pac. 532 (1928); Marlowe v. Conway Iron Works, 130 S. C. 256, 125 S. E. 569
(1924) ; Central Meat Market v. Longwell's Transfer, Inc., 62 S. W. 2d 87 (Tex.
Com. App. 1933). When warehousemen are concerned, the courts are practically
unanimous in holding that they shall not be allowed to make such contracts. See
Note, 175 A. L. R. 12, 131 (1948).
See generally, 4 WILisTox, CONTRACTS §1065A (Rev. ed. 1936).
" See note 9 supra.
" Notes, 40 MICH. L. REv. 897, 899 (1942), 86 U. PA. L. REv. 772, 777 (1938);
Note, 175 A. L. R. 12, 111 (1948).
"7 Section 3 of The Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act reads: "A Warehouseman
may insert in a receipt . . . any other terms and conditions, provided that such
terms and conditions shall not . . . (b) In any wise impair his obligation to exer-
cise that degree of care . . .which a reasonably careful man would exercise in
regard to similar goods of his own." In cases arising under this statute it has
been held that public policy -would be violated by allowing an exculpatory clause.
Lawrence Warehouse Co. v. Defense Supplies Corp., 164 F. 2d 773 (9th Cir.
1947) ; Morse v. Imperial Grain & Warehouse Co., 40 Cal. App. 574, 181 Pac. 815
(1919) ; Renfroe v. Fouche, 26 Ga. App. 340, 106 S. E. 303 (1921) ; Scott Auto &
Supply Co. v. McQueen, 111 Okla. 107, 226 Pac. 372 (1924) ; Bank of California
Nat. Asso. v. Schmaltz, 139 Or. 163. 9 P. 2d 112 (1932).
"delit Storage Co. v. Kingsbury, 76 F. 2d 978 (D. . Cir.), modified on
other grounds, 79 F. 2d 705 (D. C. Cir. 1935) ; Kravitz v. Parking Service Co.,
29 Ala. App. 523, 199 So. 727, cert. denied, 240 Ala. 467. 199 So. 731 (1940). This
is the English common law holding; except where modified by statute, an ordinary
[Vol. 30
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parties must be given freedom of contract.19 This view does not seem
to be supported by reason, however, as it is a generally recognized
principle that freedom of contract is always controlled by considerations
of public policy20
In the instant case, the great disparity of bargaining power was
recognized, the court pointing out that the conditions were predeter-
mined in favor of the bailee. 21 Thus, the court's reasoning that a profes-
sional bailee in such a position cannot contract away his liability is
clearly supported by the weight of authority and reason.
JAmE:s M. HOLLOWELL.
Charities-Liability for Torts of Employees
Liability is generally incurred by employers for the negligent conduct
of their employees in the course of their employment.' However, at
bailee may contract to limit his liability for negligence. Van Toll v. South Eastern
R. R. Co., 12 C. B. N. S. 75, 142 Eng. Reprint 1071 (1862); Rutter v. Palmer, 2
K. B. 87 (1922). "The Federal courts permit the private bailee to limit his lia-
bility for negligence, but do not extend this privilege to public bailees, as it is con-
sidered that such an extension would be contrary to public policy." Note, 8 N. C.
L. Rav. 282, 284 (1930). But in Note, 86 U. PA. L. Rlv. 772, 774 (1938), it is
stated that ". . . the Federal courts . . . have upheld conditions exempting bailees
from responsibility for negligence and have found that they violate no rule of pub-
lic policy." Both cite McCormich v. Shippy, 124 Fed. 48 (2d Cir. 1903). However,
the court there states, "There is no question of public policy involved. It is well
settled that the parties in such a case have the right to provide by apt language
against liability for negligence." It appears that the view expressed in The Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review is correct. See Inland Compress Co. v. Sim-
mons, 59 Okla. 287, 159 Pac. 262 (1916).
1" See Munger Auto Co. v. American Lloyds of Dallas, 267 S. W. 304 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1924) (where the court held that the due process clause of the state
constitution guaranteed the right of a garage keeper to make a contract limiting
liability). See Note, 175 A. L. R. 12, 135 (1948).
21 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§574, 575 (1932).
S,,... the constantly increasing number of automobiles render[s] the question
of parking a matter of public concern .... People who work in the business sec-
tions of our cities and towns and who rely on automobiles for transportation find
it difficult-sometimes impossible-to locate a place on the public streets where daily
parking is permitted. They are driven to seek accommodation in some parking
lot maintained for the service of the public. There they are met by predetermined
conditions which create a marked disparity of bargaining power and place them
in the position where they must either accede to the conditions or else forego the
desired service." Miller's Mutual Fire Insurance Assoc. v. Parker, 234 N. C. 20,
24, 65 S. E. 2d 341, 343 (1951).
1 Liability is based on the respondeat superior doctrine. The reason for the
doctrine is that it is more just to make the person who has entrusted his employee
with the power of acting in his business responsible for injury occasioned to an-
other in the course of so acting, rather than leave the other, an entirely innocent
party, to bear the loss or attempt a usually inadequate recovery from the employee.
Schedivy v. McDernott, 113 Cal. App. 218, 298 Pac. 107 (1931) ; Phillips v. West-
ern Union Tel. Co., 270 Mo. 676, 195 S. W. 711 (1917) ; Bernstein v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 174 Misc. Rep. 74, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 856 (1940); Wright v. Wright,
229 N. C. 503, 50 S. E. 2d 540 (1948) ; Hammond v. Eckerd's, 220 N. C. 596, 18
S. E. 2d 151 (1942); West v. F. W. Woolv.orth Co., 215 N. C. 211, 1 S. E. 2d
546 (1939).
1951]
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an early date, charitable institutions2 were declared to be an exception
to this general rule.3 Since most courts from the beginning sought to
qualify this exception, it is doubtful if there ever existed a doctrine of full
immunity.4 Even courts that gave lip service to the full immunity doc-
'A charitable institution is variously defined by the courts as one that is for
the relief of a certain class of persons, either by alms, education or care, and is
supported in whole or part at public expense or by charity. See City of Vicksburg
v. Vicksburg Sanatorium, 117 Miss. 709, 78 So. 702 (1918) (privately owned
corporation treating paying patients held to be charitable institution) ; Rockaway
Beach Hosp. and Disp. v. Dillon, 284 N. Y. 176, 30 N. E. 2d 373 (1940) (hospital
held to be charitable institution) ; Bruce v. Y.M.C.A., 51 Nev. 372, 277 Pac. 798
(1929) (Y.M.C.A. held to be charitable institution) ; Utica Trust and Deposit Co.
v. Thompson, 87 Misc. 31, 149 N. Y. Supp. 392 (1914) (where a gift or bequest
is left to a "charitable institution" the court will not let the gift or bequest fail
for uncertainty, it will pick an appropriate institution); PRossER, ToRTs 1079
(1941) ; Zollman, Damnage Liability of Charitable Institutions, 19 MiCH. L. REv.
395 (1921).
'The doctrine of tort immunity for charities originated in England, by way
of dicta in the following cases: Duncan v. Findlater, 6 Clark and Fin. 894, 7 Eng.
Reprint 934 (1839) ; The Feoffees of Heriot's Hosp. v. Ross, 12 Clark and Fin.
507, 8 Eng. Reprint 1508 (1846). These dicta were later adopted as a direct
holding in Holliday v. Saint Leonard, 11 C. B. N. S. 192 (1861). The doctrine
was then expressly repudiated in England: Mersey Docks Trustee v. Gibbs, L. R.
1 H. L. 93 (1866) ; Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury, L. R. 6 Q. B. 214 (1871).
Massachusetts and Maryland adopted as a rule the doctrine which had been re-
pudiated in England, giving it a new lease on life in America. McDonald v. Mass.
Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529 (1876) ; Perry v. House of Refuge,
63 Md. 20, 52 Am. Rep. 495 (1895).
"In twelve states strangers are allowed to recover against the charity: Evans
v. Memorial Hosp., 133 Conn. 311, 50 A. 2d 443 (1946); Cashman v. Meriden
Hosp., 117 Conn. 587, 169 Atl. 915 (1933) ; St. Vincent's Hosp. v. Stine, 195 Ind.
350, 144 N. E. 537 (1924) ; Lusk v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 199
So. 666 (La. App. 1941) ; Erwin v. St. Joseph Hosp., 324 Mich. 114, 34 N. W. 2d
480 (1948); Bruce v. Henry Ford Hosp., 245 Mich. 394, 236 N. W. 813 (1931);
Wright v. Salvation Army, 125 Neb. 216, 249 N. W. 549 (1933) ; Beanchi v. South
Park Presbyterian Church, 123 N. J. L. 328, 8 A. 2d 567 (1939); Herndon v.
Massey, 217 N. C. 610, 8 S. E. 2d 914 (1940); Cullen v. Schmit, 139 Ohio St.
194, 39 N. E. 2d 146 (1942) ; Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 R. I. 22, 85 Atl. 120
(1912); City of McAllen v. Gartman, 81 S. W. 2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935);
Weston's Adm'x v. Hosp. of St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 587, 107 S. E. 785
(1921) ; Heckman v. Sisters of the Charity of Providence, 5 Wash. 2d 699, 106
P. 2d 593 (1940).
Eleven states apparently adhere to full immunity. See Note 5 infra. This term
is used to denote non-liability on the basis of respondeat superior. The charity
may still be liable for its omn negligence.
In six states strangers and paying beneficiaries may recover but the question
has been reserved as to non-paying beneficiaries: Carter v. Alabama Baptist Hosp.
Board, 277 Ala. 560, 151 So. 62 (1933) ; England v. Hosp. of Good Samaritan, 14
Cal. 2d 791, 97 P. 2d 813 (1939) ; Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 145 Fla.
360, 199 So. 344 (1940) ; Robertson v. Executive Committee of Baptist Convention,
55 Ga. App. 469, 190 S. E. 432 (1937) ; Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints
Hosp., 59 Idaho 350, 82 P. 2d 849 (1938); Sessions v. Thomas Dee Memorial
Hosp., 94 Utah 460, 78 P. 2d 645 (1938).
Two jurisdictions impose liability if the charity is protected by insurance:
O'Conner v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n. 105 Colo. 259, 96 P. 2d 835
(1939); Vanderbilt University v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S. W. 2d
284 (1938).
Six states apparently have no decisions involving strangers, but hold that the
charity is not liable to beneficiaries: Jensen v. Maine Eye and Ear Infirmary, 107
Me. 408, 78 Atl. 898 (1910) ; Miss. Baptist Hosp. v. Moore, 156 Miss. 676, 126 So.
[Vol. so
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trine do not always follow it.5
The present area of conflict is the so called "stranger to the charity-
beneficiary of the charity" distinction. 6 The majority of the courts
allow strangers to the charity such as visitors, bystanders, invitees and
employees to recover against it, but refuse to allow beneficiaries of the
charity to recover. 7 A few jurisdictions draw a distinction between
paying and non-paying beneficiaries, allowing the former to recover.8
Until recently, only five jurisdictions in the United States had com-
465 (1930); Borgeas v. Ore. Short Line R. R., 73 Mont. 407, 236 Pac. 1069(1925) ; Bruce v. Y.M.C.A., 51 Nev. 372, 277 Pac. 789 (1929) ; Rovers v. Ohio
Valley Gen. Hosp., 98 W. Va. 476, 127 S. E. 318 (1925); Bishop Randall Hosp.
v. Hartley, 24 Wyo. 408, 160 Pac. 385 (1916).
Seven states have now imposed unqualified liability. See notes 9 and 10 infra.
In Delaware, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Vermont the question has ap-
parently never reached the courts.
The following jurisdictions have worked in these exceptions: Arkansas Valley
Co-op Rural Electric Co. v. Elkins, 200 Ark. 883, 141 S. W. 2d 538 (1940)(strangers) ; Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N. E. 2d 81 (1950) ; Wendt v.
Servite Fathers, 332 Ill. App. 618, 76 N. E. 2d 342 (1947); Maretick v. South
Chicago Community Hosp., 297 Ill. App. 488, 17 N. E. 2d 1012 (1938) (patients);
Ratliffe v. Wesley Hosp. and Nurse Training School, 135 Kan. 306, 10 P. 2d 859
(1932) (patient); Emery v. Jewish Hosp. Ass'n, 193 Ky. 400, 236 S. W. 577(1921) (employee) ; Loeffler v. Trustees of Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hosp., 130
Md. 265, 100 At. 301 (1817) (stranger) ; Zoulalian v. New England Sanatorium
and Benevolent Ass'n, 230 Mass. 102, 119 N. E. 686 (1918) (employee); Eads v.
Y.W.C.A., 325 Mo. 577, 29 S. W. 2d 701 (1930) (employee); Hill v. President
and Trustees of Tualatin Academy and Pacific University, 61 Ore. 190, 11 Pac.
901 (1912) (invitee) ; Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 Atl. 1087(1910) (paying patient); Vermillion v. Women's College of Due West, 104 S. C.
197, 88 S. E. 649 (1916) (invitee); Waldman v. Y.M.C.A., 227 Wisc. 45, 277
N. W. 632 (1938) (invitee).
' See Bodenheimre v. Confederation Memorial Ass'n, 68 F. 2d 507 (4th Cir.
1934) (plaintiff visiting the Ass'n was held to be a beneficiary) ; Boeckel v. Orange
Memorial Hosp., 108 N. J. L. 453, 158 Atl. 146 (1932) (Held visitors to be
beneficiaries) ; Bianchi v. Southe Park Presbyterian Church, 123 N. J. L. 325, 8
A. 2d 567 (1939) (member of a girl scout troop meeting in the church was held
to be beneficiary) ; President and Dir. of Georgetown College v. Huges, 130 F. 2d
810 (D. C. Cir. 1942).
See Zollman, Damage Liability of Charitable Institutions, 19 MIcH. L. Rv.
395, 412 (1921); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §402 (1935). For collections of cases,
see Notes, 14 A. L. R. 572 (1921); 23 A. L. R. 923 (1923); 30 A. L. R. 445
(1924) ; 33 A. L. R. 1369 (1924) ; 42 A. L. R. 971 (1926) ; 62 A. L. R. 724 (1929) ;
109 A. L. R. 1199 (1937) ; 124 A. L. R. 814 (1940) ; 133 A. L. R. 821 (1941) ; 160
A. L. R. 256 (1946).
' Cohen v. General Hosp. Soc. of Connecticut, 113 Conn. 188, 154 Atl. 435(1931); Hearn v. Waterbury Hosp., 66 Conn. 98, 33 Atl. 595 (1895); Winona
Technical Institute v. Stalte, 173 Ind. 39, 89 N. E. 393 (1909); Bruce v. Central
Methodist Episcopal Church, 147 Mich. 230, 110 N. W. 951 (1907); Bruce v.
Henry Ford Hosp., 254 Mich. 394, 236 N. W. 813 (1913); Marble v. Nicholas
Senn. Hosp., 102 Neb. 343, 167 N. W. 208 (1918); Daniels v. Rahway Hosp., 10
N. J. Misc. 585, 160 Atl. 644 (1932) ; Cowans v. North Carolina Baptist Hosp.,
197 N. C. 41, 147 S. E. 672 (1929) ; Herudon v. Massey, 217 N. C. 610, 8 S. E. 2d
914 (1940) ; Pflugfelder v. Convent of Good Shepherd, 55 Ohio App. 158, 9 N. E.
2d 4 (1936) ; Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 R. I. 22, 85 Atl. 120 (1912) ; Armen-
darez v. Hotel Dieu, 145 S. W. 1030 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Hospital of St.
Vincent of Paul v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 81 S. E. 13 (1914); Hechman v.
Sisters of the Charity of Providence, 5 Wash. 2d 699, 106 P. 2d 593 (1940).
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pletely overruled the charity immunity doctrine.9 Now two other juris-
dictions have joined this group. In both of these cases, plaintiffs, while
patients in the defendant hospitals, were injured through the alleged
negligence of employees. The courts held the charities liable for their
employees' torts on the same basis as other employers and expressly
overruled prior decisions to the contrary.'o
The North Carolina court agrees with the majority, distinguishing
between strangers to the charity and beneficiaries of the charity, and
denies recovery to the latter group. The latest North Carolina decision
is Herndon v. Massey."1
The immunity of charities from liability for torts of their employees
has been based upon four considerations: (1) the trust fund theory, (2)
the inapplicability of the doctrine of respondeat superior, (3) implied
waiver, (4) public policy.
Courts resorting to the trust fund theory say that liability would
violate the donor's intention; would misappropriate the fund to un-
authorized purposes and to persons not within the intended class of
beneficiaries; and would in effect indemnify the trustees,' 2 if the charity
is organized as a trust,13 against the consequence of their own or their
'Borwege v. City of Owatonna, 190 Minn. 394, 251 N. W. 915 (1933); Welch
v. Frisbie Memorial Hosp., 90 N. H. 337, 9 A. 2d 761 (1939) ; Dillon v. Rockaway
Beach Hosp. and Disp., 284 N. Y. 176, 30 N. E. 2d 373 (1940) (". . . it is now
settled that even a charitable hospital is liable for the acts of its servants.");
Richbeil v. Grafton Hosp., 74 N. D. 525, 23 N. W. 2d 247 (1946); Oklahoma's
reports appear to place it in the full liability group, although the only cases found
involve strangers and paying patients: Sisters of the Sorrowful Mother v. Zeidler,
183 Old. 454, 82 P. 2d 996 (1938) (paying patient); Gable v. Salvation Army,
186 Oki. 687, 100 P. 2d 244 (1940) (stranger). In addition to these jurisdictions,
England, Canada and New Zealand have adopted the full liability doctrine. Hillyer
v. Governors of St. Bartholomew's Hosp., 2 K. B. 820 (1909) ; Powell v. Streatham
Manor Nursing Home, [1935] A. C. 243; Lindsey County Council v. Marshall
:[1937] A. C. 97, 1 K. B. 516 (1935); Lanere v. Smith Falls Public Hosp., 35
0. L. R. 98, 26 D. L. R. 346 (1915). See Goodhart, Hospitals and Trained Nurses,
54 L. Q. Rav. 553 (1938) ; Wright, Liability for Negligence of ANurses and Doctors,
14 CAN . B. REv. 699 (1936).
-J' Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 230 P. 2d 220 (Ariz. 1951); Haynes v.
Presbyterian Hosp., 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N. W. 2d 151 (1950).
- "1217 N. C. 610, 85 S. E. 2d 914 (1940); See Note, 19 N. C. L. Ray. 245
(1941). Cf. Flanner v. Saint Joseph Home, 227 N. C. 342, 42 S. E. 2d 225 (1947).
1 .2 Since the adaptation of the trust to business as well as family purposes, and
those of managing property generally, recourse to the trust res has been much
more frequent in recent years. Under modern trust law, a trustee is exonerated
or reimbursed from the trust res for liability incurred in carrying out the trust
purpose. Uniform Trust Act §§13 and 14; Fulda and Pond, Tort Liability of Trust
Estates, 41 CoL. L. REv. 1332 (1941) ; Kerr, Liability of the Trust Estates for
Torts of -the Trustee's Servants, 5 TEX. L. Ra¢. 368 (1927). By express provisions,
North Carolina statutes on Trusts and Trustees are made inapplicable to trustees
of charitable trusts. N. C. GEi. STAT., §§36-36(b), 36-37(5) (1943).
. Courts do not hesitate to hold an individual liable for failure to exercise due
care even though his endeavors are charitable. See Note, 22 VA. L. REv. 58 (1935) ;
President and Dir.of Georgetown College v. Huges, 130 F. 2d 810. 815 (D. C. Cir.
1942) : "But when the charity is incorporated, somehow charity plus incorporation
creates a certainty of immunity neither can attain apart from the other." Only
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subordinate's misconduct.14 The apparent fear here is that donors
would be deterred from creating charities and from adding to their
funds by subsequent donations. Yet most of these same courts al-
low strangers to the charity to recover.' 5 There is a failure to see
that so-called dissipation and deterrence will take place whether dam-
ages are paid to strangers to the charity or to a beneficiary of the charity.
Moreover, with the increased use of accident and liability insurance by
charitable institutions, there would appear to be little or no losses
actually incurred by them even if they were held liable for their em-
ployees' torts.16 Likewise this theory would have no application where
the charity was not created or supported by donors.
Some jurisdictions hold that the doctrine of respondeat superior is
inapplicable to charitable institutions.' 7 The reasoning given to sup-
port this theory is that charities are not operated for profit and that they
stand in the relationship of a "good Samaritan" to the beneficiary. This
loses sight of the fact that application of the doctrine of respondeat
superior depends upon whether the relationship of employer and em-
ployee exists at the time of the tort.' 8 It does not depend upon the
employer's being organized for profit nor upon the relationship of the
injured person to the employer. 19 Some jurisdictions have limited this
four cases have been found where unincorporated charitable associations, not con-
stituted as trusts, have been held immune to liability for their employees' torts.
Farrigan v. Perear, 193 Mass. 147, 78 N. E. 885 (1906) ; Herndon v. Massey, 217
N. C. 610, 8 S. E. 2d 914 (1940) ; Burgie v. Muench, 65 Ohio App. 176, 29 N. E.
2d 439 (1940) ; Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624, 15 Atl. 553 (1888).
I In the following cases, the courts relied primarily on the trust fund theory
in holding the charities immune. Arkansas Valley Co-op Rural Electric Co. v.
Elkins, 200 Ark. 883, 141 S. W. 2d 583 (1940) ; St. Mary's Academy of Sisters
v. Solomon, 77 Colo. 463, 238 Pac. 22 (1925) ; Parks v. Northwestern University,
218 Ill. 381, 75 N. E. 991 (1905); Webb v. Vought, 129 Kan. 799, 275 Pac. 170
(1929) ; Jesen v. Maine Eye and Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 Atl. 898 (1910) ;
Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20, 52 Am. Rep. 495 (1885); MacDonald v.
Mass. Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529 (1876); Downes v. Harper
Hosp., 101 Mich. 555, 60 N. W. 42 (1894); Eads v. Y.M.C.A., 325 Mo. 577, 29
S. W. 2d 701 (1930) ; Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 245, 75 At. 1087
(1910); Abston v. Waldon Academy, 118 Tenn. 24, 102 S. W. 351 (1907).
: See note 7 supra.
1North Carolina has a long established doctrine that evidence of insurance is
ordinarily incompetent. Flanner v. Saint Joseph Home, 227 N. C. 342, 42 S. E. 2d
225 (1947) ; Duke v. Comm'r, 214 N. C. 570, 190 S. E. 918 (1938) ; Scott v. Bryan,
210 N. C. 478, 187 S. E. 756 (1936). See N. C. GuN. STAT. §160-191.5 (Supp.
1951) (a cause of action exists against a municipality only if it has insurance, yet
no evidence of such insurance is permissible). See note 25 infra.
17 Evans v. Lawrence Hosp., 133 Conn. 311, 50 A. 2d 433 (1946) ; Lovich v.
Salvation Army, 80 Ohio App. 285, 75 N. E. 2d 459 (1947) ; Bachman v. Y.M.C.A.,
179 Wisc. 178, 191 N. W. 751 (1922).
.8 Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 230 P. 2d 220 (Ariz. 1950); Wright v.
Wright, 229 N. C. 503, 50 S. E. 2d 540 (1948); Hammond v. Eckerd's, 220 N. C.
596, 18 S. E. 2d 151 (1942) ; West v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 215 N. C. 211, 1 S. E.
2d 546 (1939).
a Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, supra note 18; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §§1-14
(1933).
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doctrine of immunity to beneficiaries of the charity, 20 but it would seem
that if a stranger may invoke the doctrine of respondeat superior, then
a beneficiary, whether he be paying or non-paying, may likewise in-
voke it.
In other jurisdictions, the injured party is confronted with an im-
plied waiver theory; i.e., when one enters a charitable institution, by
accepting the services rendered, he waives all right to claim damages
for injuries suffered as a result of the negligence of the charity or its
employees.2 1  This theory is based entirely on legal fiction. In some
instances this fiction is based upon physical impossibilities. In the case
of a patient who is unconscious from whatever cause when he enters, or
of a very young child, there could not be an actual implied waiver of
any right. Thus it would appear that the waiver theory amounts merely
to imposing immunity as a matter of law when other reasoning is found
insufficient to support it.
Finally, there are courts supporting non-liability upon a public policy
theory.22 Public policy, when declared, is a crystallized conception of
what the legislatures or the courts deem better for the public at large.
It is not quiescent, but actively changing with the times. In the early
days of the nonliability theories, the general good of society may have
demanded this form of encouragement of charitable institutions. But
today the standing of charitable institutions is vastly different.2 8 If
public policy ever required that charities should be immune from liability
10 See note 7 supra.
21 In the following cases, the courts refused to allow the injured party to re-
cover, basing their decisions on an implied waiver. Power v. Mass. Homoeopathic
Hosp., 109 Fed. 294 (1st Cir. 1901) ; Stonaker v. Big Sisters Hosp., 116 Cal. App.
375, 2 P. 2d 530 (1931) ; Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hosp., 59 Idaho
350, 82 P. 2d 849 (1938); St. Vincent's Hosp. v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N. E.
537 (1924); Bruche v. Central Methodist Episcopal Church, 147 Mich, 230, 119
N. W. 951 (1907) ; Bruche v. Y.M.C.A., 51 Nev. 372, 277 Pac. 789 (1929) ; Hos-
pital of St. Vincent of Paul v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 81 S. E. 13 (1914).
22 Emery v. Jewish Hosp. 193 Ky. 400, 236 S. W. 577 (1821) ; Ducan v. Ne-
braska Sanitarium and Benevolent Ass'n, 92 Neb. 162, 137 N. W. 1120 (1912);
D'Anato v. Orange Memorial Hosp., 101 N. J. L. 61, 127 Atl. 340 (1925); Lindler
v. Columbia Hosp., 98 S. C. 25, 81 S. E. 512 (1914) ; Weston's Adm'x v. Hospital
of St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 587, 107 S. E. 785 (1921). See Ray v. Tucson
Medical Center, 230 P. 2d 220, 223 (Ariz. 1951).
2 Many hospitals of today have grown into enormous businesses employing
many persons. They own and hold large assets, tax free by statute. Moreover,
the state has become paternal as evidenced by numerous statutes such as those for
the relief of soldiers, sailors and marines; support for the poor; county homes;
indigent tuberculosis patients; medical and surgical treatment of indigent persons.
Many courts are taking judicial notice of the extensive use of the many types
of hospital insurance, as well as liability insurance by charitable institutions. Notes,
20 B. U. L. Rzv. 330 (1940); 53 HARv. L. Ray. 873 (1940); 24 MINN. L. Ray.
696 (1940); 12 Rocy MT. L. Rav. 135 (1940); 14 TENN. L. Ray. 468 (1937).
In Louisiana, the plaintiff may sue the insurance company directly and the defense
of charity is not available. Lusk v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 199
So. 666 (La. App. 1941).
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for the torts of their employees that policy would appear no longer to
exist.2 4
It is believed that charities today should respond as do private indi-
viduals, business corporations and others, when their employees commit
a tort.-Y' This could be accomplished by legislation or by court decisions
as in the Arizona-and Iowa cases.
ROLAND C. BRASWELU.
Constitutional Law-Effect of Press Publicity
on Criminal Defendant
In Shepard v. Florida,1 the concurring justices2 point to aspects
of the case ignored by a per curiam decision which reversed a rape
conviction because of discrimination against Negroes in jury selection.3
The concurring opinion pointed to the "lynch" atmosphere that con-
trolled the area following the alleged offense, attributing it to racial
prejudice.4 A mob attempted to take the prisoners from jail; the home
of the parents of one defendant was burned as were two other Negro
homes. All Negroes abandoned the area until military units restored
order. Prejudicial articles, daily accounts of the mob actions, and a
cartoon showing four electric chairs demanding "No Compromise-
Supreme Penalty" appeared in the local newspapers. No confession was
introduced in evidence yet the press printed reports that the defendants
had confessed, and the sheriff was credited as being the source of the
information. These published reports were never repudiated or re-
tracted. Although motions to delay the trial and for change of venue
were denied, extraordinary and observable precautions were adopted by
the trial judge to prevent violence in the court-room.
Justice Jackson calls the jury discrimination a trivial matter when
compared with these elements:
"' "The fact that the courts may have at an early date, in response to what
appeared good as a matter of policy, created an immunity, does not appear to us a
sound reason for continuing the same, when under all legal theories, it is basically
unsound and especially so, when the reasons upon which it was built, no longer
exist." Haynes v. Presbyterian Hosp., 241 Iowa 1269, 1274, 45 N. W. 2d 151,
154 (1950).
" See ScoTT, TRUSTS §402 (1939); HARPER, TORTS §294 (1933); PROSSER,
ToRTs 1079 (1941); Applaman, The Tort Liability of Charitable Institutions. 22
A. B. A. J. 48 (1936) ; Feezer, The Tort of Charities, 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 191(1928); See Notes, 14 B. U. L. Rrv. 477 (1924); 22 VA. L. REv. 58 (1935); 48
Yale L. J. 81 (1938).
171 Sup. Ct. 549 (1951).2 Justice Jackson with whom justice Frankfurter joined, 71 Sup. Ct. 549 (1951).
Citing Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282 (1950).
'But see Shepard v. State, 46 So. 2d 880, 883 (Fla. 1950) "The inflamed public
sentiment was against the crime with which the appellants were charged rather
than the defendants' race."
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"g... prejudicial influences outside the courtroom, becoming all too
typical of a highly publicized trial, were brought to bear on the
jury with such force that the conclusion is inescapable that these
defendants were prejudged as guilty and the trial was but a legal
gesture to register a verdict already dictated by the press and the
public opinion which is generated.... This trial took place under
conditions and was accompanied by events which would deny de-
fendants a fair trial before any kind of jury .... The case pre-
sents one of the best examples of one of the worst menaces to
American justice."5
In Moore v. Dempsey,6 the Court condemned mob domination of a
trial: "the whole proceeding is a mask. . . .counsel, jury and judge
were swept to the fatal end by an irresistible wave of public passion .... -7
It is possible, as in the instant case, that mob activity outside the court-
room may so inflame community sentiment that a fair trial has been
made impossible. However, this note is restricted to the role of com-
munication media, whose widespread dissemination of crime news, may
work a denial of due process.
The conflict between freedom of the press and the right to an un-
biased trial presents a serious dilemma.8 To protect this right a free
press is indispensable yet that same free press is today the greatest threat
to a fair trial.9 The danger lies in sensational criminal cases which are
so thoroughly reported that most admissible evidence, and much that
is inadmissible, has been presented to the prospective jurors long prior
to trial. 10 Newspapers, radio, and now television are the media through
which information true and false, reaches the prospective jury without
oath and without opportunity for cross-examination. Confessions, prior
criminal records of the accused and of members of his family, community
hostility toward the defendant-all become common knowledge. To
5 Shepard v. Florida, 71 Sup. Ct. 549 (1951).6261 U. S. 86 (1923). Cf. Jones v. State, 185 Md. 481, 45 A. 2d 350 (1946).
But cf. State v. Newsome, 195 N. C. 552, 143 S. E. 187 (1928), criticized in Note,
7 N. C. L. Rv. 179 (1929). Defendant was assaulted amid cries of "take him,
take him" while trial was in progress and jury was in the box, but the appeal was
not based on this point.
261 U. S. 86, 91 (1923).
s In cases of newspaper contempt, the premissible area of comment on pendingjudicial matters is examined in light of the "clear and present danger" rule. Where
no jury was involved, the Supreme Court has reversed contempt convictions, hold-
ing that there was no "clear and present danger" that judges would be influenced
thereby to an extent endangering the judicial process. Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S.
367 (1946) (newspaper termed action of court "high-handed," "a travesty on jus-
tice," "public opinion was outraged" while motion for new trial before same court) ;
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331 (1945) (press criticisms after verdict ren-
dered based on incomplete and misleading facts).
See Note, 51 COL. L. REv. 98 (1951) for possible effect of United States v.
Dennis, 183 F. 2d 201 (1949) on the "clear and present danger" rule.
'See Bromly, Free Press v. Free Trial, 202 HAxwza's MAGAZINE 90 (1951);
Time, April 23, 1951, p. 79, col. 1.
"0 Shepard v. State, 46 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1950).
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take the attitude"- that jurors are able to wipe impressions so formed
from their minds as they enter the courtroom seems unrealistic. The
'defendant may find himself with a constitutional guarantee of jury trial
which he is unable to accept, and is forced to choose a trial without a
jury in those jurisdictions where such is permissible. 12 Freedom of the
press must not be impaired but: "Newspapers, in the enjoyment of their
constitutional rights, may not deprive accused persons of their right to
fair trial."' 3 The concurring opinion is some indication of a new aware-
ness of a problem which the courts must eventually resolve.
JACK H. PoTTs.
Joint Tort-Feasors--Validity of Covenant Not to Sue
Plaintiff, A, brought action against tort-feasors B and C to re-
cover for assault and battery. Subsequently by amendment A struck the
name of C as a defendant. The remaining defendant filed a plea in bar,
alleging that the amendment was filed in consideration of $2500 paid
to A by C in settlement of C's liability and that the agreement purport-
ing to be a covenant not to sue was in fact a release; if for no other
reason, because it was executed lis pendens.1 Held, that since the clear
intendment of the agreement shows only a covenant not to sue and not
an accord and satisfaction of the claim itself, the mere fact that it was
executed during the pendency of the suit does not release B.2
The dissenting judge agreed with the defendant, saying that an
' State v. Smarr, 121 N. C. 669, 673, 28 S. E. 549, 550 (1897) ("The impres-
sion once entertained of the dangerous effect upon a juror's mind of having read
newspaper versions of an offense and comments thereon has long since worn
out. .. ")
"2 See Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 67 A. 2d 497, 504 (Md. 1949), cert.
denied, 338 U. S. 912 (1950).
A liberalization of change of venue statutes would be of little aid in this age
of widespread newspaper circulation and radio-television coverage.
" Shepard v. Florida, 71, Sup. Ct. 549, 550 (1951).
"Lis pendens" as used in this case means a pending suit. "A suit is pending
after complaint is filed and process served on the defendant, or defendant has vol-
untarily appeared." Massey v. United States, 46 F. 2d 78, 79 (W. D. Wash. 1930).
'Register v. Andris, 83, Ga. App. 632, 64 S. E. 2d 196 (1951).
A mere covenant not to sue is not a technical release and will not operate to
release any of the joint tort-feasors other than the one in whose favor it is drawn.
Papenfus v. Shell Oil Co., 254 Wis. 233, 35 N. W. 2d 920 (1949); Aljian v. Ben
Schlossberg, Inc., 8 N. J. Super. 461, 73 A. 2d 290 (1950).
However, the courts are not in agreement that the covenantee is absolutely
discharged from liability for the tort. Some still hold that he must, if sued, bring
a separate action for breach of covenant. Chicago & A. R. R. v. Averill, 224 Ill.
516, 79 N. E. 654 (1906) ; Chicago v. Babcock, 143 Ill. 358, 32 N. E. 271 (1892) ;
Oliver v. Williams, 190 Tenn. 54, 83 S. W. 2d 271 (1935) ;, Byrd v. Crowder, 166
Tenn. 215, 60 S. W. 2d 171 (1933). Others allow the covenant to be pleaded as
a defense to an action brought against the covenantee. Davis v. Moses, 172 Minn.
171, 215 N. W. 225 (1927); Judd v. Walker, 158 Mo. App. 156, 138 S. W. 655
(1911) ; Ellis v. Eason, 50 Wis. 138, 6 N. W. 518, (1880).
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instrument which had the effect of letting one of the parties out of the
suit after it was commenced amounted to a release no matter what it
was called.3 Much material has been written, in court opinions 4 and
otherwise,5 concerning the interpretation and effect of instruments which
purport to be either a release or a covenant not to sue. But no instance
has been found in which pendency of the suit has admittedly formed
any part of the basis for the court's decision.6
An increasing number of the courts today hold, in accord with the
majority opinion in the principal case, that the intention of the parties is
the controlling factor. 7 Regardless of the label placed upon the agree-
ment,8 if it is evident by construing the entire agreement that a covenant
' The dissent states: "A covenant not to sue an action already filed is not a
covenant not to sue no matter what it is called by the parties or anybody else.
"... The law should not add to the anomalous holdings one to the effect that
a party can do an impossible thing by agreeing not to do what he has already
done and call a spade a club with impunity." Register v. Andris, supra note 2 at
- , 64 S. E. 2d 196, 197-198 (1951).
'Dwy v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74, 92 Atl. 883 (1915) ; Moore v. Smith,
78 Ga. App. 49, 50 S. E. 2d 219 (1948); Parry Mfg. Co. v. Crull, 56 Ind. App.
77, 101 N. E. 756 (1913); McDonald v. Goddard Grocery Co., 184 Mo. App. 432,
171 S. W. 650 (1914) ; Matheson v. O'Kane, 211 Mass. 91, 97 N. E. 638 (1912) ;
Masterson v. Berlin St. Ry., 83 N. H. 190, 139 AtI. 753 (1927); Smithwick v.
Ward, 52 N. C. 64 (1859). See Braswell v. Morrow, 195 N. C. 127, 130-131, 141
S. E. 489, 491 (1928).
Notes, 51 Dicxc L. REv. 191 (1947) ; 22 MiN. L. REv. 692 (1938) ; 28 TEXAS
L. REv. 599 (1950) ; 19 VA. L. Rav. 881 (1933) ; 24 YALE L. J. 505 (1915).
'E.g. New York C. & St. L. R. Co. v. American Transit Lines, 339 Ill. App.
282, 89 N. E. 2d 858 (1949); Chicago & A. Ry. Co. v. Averill, 224 Ill. 516, 79
N. E. 654 (1906); Matheson v. O'Kane, 211 Mass. 91, 97 N. E. 638 (1912);
Green v. Lang Co., 206 P. 2d 626 (Utah 1949).
'The troublesome agreements are those which use the language of a release
but which also contain a reservation of a right of action against the remaining
joint tort-feasor. Some courts take the view that such a clause is repugnant to
the operation of the release and will ignore it and hold that the instrument operates
as -a release of all persons jointly liable. Aiken v. Insull, 122 F. 2d 746 (7th Cir.
1941) (construing the Illinois law). Other courts, which give effect to the intent
of the parties, will honor this reservation and say that a mere covenant not to sue
was intended. Carey v. Bilby, 129 Fed. 203 (8th Cir. 1904) ; Home Telephone Co.
v. Fields, 150 Ala. 306, 43 So. 711 (1907) ; Dwy v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74,
92 Atl. 883 (1915) ; Edens v. Fletcher, 79 Kan. 143, 98 Pac. 784 (1908) ; Gilbert
v. Finch, 173 N. Y. 455, 66 N. E. 133 (1903); All American Bus Lines v. Saxon,
197 Okla. 395, 172 P. 2d 424 (1946); Duck v. Mayeu, 2 Q. B. 511 (1892). In a
leading case, Bloss v. Plymale, 3 W. Va. 293 (1869), at page 307 it was said:
. . . a contract or agreement . . . plain and express in its terms, shall not be
construed, nor made to defeat the object and intention of the parties...." See
also Garbee v. Halloran, 150 Ohio St. 476, 83 N. E. 2d 217 (1948).
Some states now have statutes which specifically provide that all releases and
discharges of obligations in writing must be construed according to the intention of
the parties. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §391 (1940).
RESTATEmENT, TORTS §885 (1939) provides: "(1) A valid release of one tort-
feasor from liability for a harm, given by the injured person, discharges all others
liable for the same harm, unless the parties to the release agree that the release
shall not discharge the others, if the release is embodied in a document, unless such
agreement appears in the document. (2) A covenant not to sue one tort-feasor for
a harm does not discharge any other liable for the harm."
'In McKenna v. Austin, 134 F. 2d 659, 665 (D. C. Cir. 1943), it was said: "It
is not material whether the instrument be considered a release or a covenant not
to sue."
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not to sue, or its legal equivalent, 9 was intended then the other joint
tort-feasor' o will not be released..1
Another factor that is considered by most of the courts is whether
there has been partial or complete satisfaction of the claim for damages.
The injured party is entitled to but one complete satisfaction since this
is acceptance of full compensation for an injury.12 Partial satisfaction
is not to be treated as a release,13 but usually will be applied pro tanto
towards satisfaction of the claim.' 4
'The primary purpose of a covenant not to sue is to release the covenantee
from liability to the injured party for a particular wrong without affecting the in-jured party's rights against the remaining joint tort-feasors (excelpt, in most
jurisdictions, in so far as satisfaction of the claim has been received). Therefore,
the courts that give effect to the reservation of a right of action against the re-
maining joint tort-feasors are giving the legal effect usually desired and accom-
plished by executing a covenant not to sue, even though they might continue to
call the instrument a release.
10 Many of the courts today apply the same rules regarding releases and cove-
nants not to sue to joint tort-feasors and joint obligors. See CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§1251 (1950) where it is said regarding the English practice: "In the case ofjoint obligors, the devise of a contract not to sue was adopted in order to escape
the technical rule applicable to joint contractors, that the discharge of one joint
obligor necessarily discharges all the others. Not wishing to give effect to their
own unreasonable rule, the common law courts held that a release of one joint
obligor, expressly reserving all rights against the other joint obligor, would be
interpreted as a mere contract not to sue the one instead of a release."
"' See note 1 supra.
12 Urton v. Price, 57 Cal. 270 (1881) ; Abbott v. City of Senath, 243 S. W. 641
(Mo. Sup. 1922) ; Aljian v. Ben Schlossberg, Inc., 8 N. J. Super. 461, 73 A. 2d 290
(1950) ; Bradshaw v. Baylor Univ., 126 Tex. 99, 84 S. W. 2d 703 (1935) ; Green
v. Lang, 206 P. 2d 626 (Utah 1949) ; Haase v. Employers Ins. Co., 250 Wis. 422,
27 N. W. 2d 468 (1947). Contra: Devaney v. Otis Elevator Co., 251 Ill. 28, 95
N. E. 990 (1911); Papenfus v. Shell Oil Co., 254 Wis. 233, 35 N. W. 2d 920
(1949). See Prosser, Joint Tort and Several Liability, 25 CAL. L. REv. 413, 425(1937).
The North Carolina court is in accord with the majority. Smith v. Thompson,
210 N. C. 672, 188 S. E. 395 (1939) ; Holland v. Utilities Co., 208 N. C. 289, 180
S. E. 592 (1935); Braswell v. Morrow, 195 N. C. 127, 141 S. E. 489 (1928);
Sircey v. Rees, 155' N. C. 296, 71 S. E. 310 (1911) ; Howard v. Plumbing Co., 154
N. C. 224, 70 S. E. 285 (1911). And this is true regardless of who makes the
payment. Holland v. Utilities Co., supra.
13 "Plaintiff had the right to receive full damages for her cause of action."
City of Covington v. Westbay, 156 Ky. 839, 844, 162 S. W. 91, 94 (1914). Ac-
cord, Louisville & Evansville Mail Co. v. Barnes' Adm'r, 117 Ky. 860, 79 S. W. 261
(1904) ; McKenna v. Austin, 134 F. 2d 659 (D. C. Cir. 1943). And see Booker
v. Meilke, 96 S. W. 2d 919, 921 (Mo. App. 1936) where it is said that the burden
should be on the "unreleased" tort-feasor to allege and prove full satisfaction of
the claim. "The issue of accord and satisfaction is one of fact for the jury."
Matheson v. O'Kane, 211 Mass. 91, 96, 97 N. E. 638, 640 (1912).
"Pacific State Lumber Co. v. Barger, 10 F. 2d 335 (9th Cir. 1926) ; Dwy v.
Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74, 92 Atl. 883 (1915) ; New York C. & St. L. R. R. v.
American Transit Lines, 339 Ill. App. 282, 89 N. E. 2d 858 (1949), rev'd on other
grounds, 408 Ill. 336, 97 N. E. 2d 264 (1951) ; Aldridge v. Morris, 337 Ill. App.
269, 86 N. E. 2d 143 (1949) (settling the law in Illinois); Parry Mfg. Co. v.
Crull, 56 Ind. App. 77, 101 N. E. 756 (1914); Carlisle v. Woener, 149 Kan. 598,
89 P. 2d 29 (1939) ; Mason v. Stephens and Blades Lumber Co., 167 N. C. 370,
84 S. E. 527 (1915); Haase v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 250 Wis. 422,
27 N. W. 2d 468 (1947). But see Papenfus v. Shell Oil Co., 256 Wis. 233, 35
N. W. 2d 920 (1949) (consideration for covenant not to sue paid by party who
was later found by jury not to be liable as joint tort-feasor held to be a voluntary
contribution not to be deducted from verdict in favor of plaintiff).
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A minority view is illustrated by the Illinois court. In Aiken v.
Insull 15 the federal court in following the Illinois law (although criti-
cizing it), held that an instrument which contained the following lan-
guage, "Nothing in this agreement and compromise ... shall be con-
strued to operate or to affect any cause of action, claims or demands
. .. against any person... other than any party to this settlement and
compromise. . .", was a release because it was couched in the terms
of a release although the obvious intent of the parties was otherwise. 16
Still another minority view is taken by the Tennessee court which holds
that any agreement which stipulates that it may be pleaded as a defense
to an action against the covenantee is a release of all joint tort-feasors
regardless of the form of the instrument.17
Confusion and perhaps injustice could possibly be avoided if a court
when faced with such instruments would, instead of concerning itself
with the technical language of the agreement, base its decision on the
answers to the following questions: (1) What was the intent of the
parties as determined by the agreement and the surrounding circum-
stances? (2) To what extent has the injured party received full com-
pensation for the injury to him?' 8
Roy M. COLE.
Labor Law-Government Seizure-Liability for Operating Loss
Presidential Executive Order No. 9340' of May 1, 1943, directed
the Secretary of the Interior to take immediate possession, so far "as
necessary or desirable," of all coal mines in which a strike had occurred
1 122 F. 2d 746 (7th Cir. 1941).
1" The Illinois rule is otherwise in contract cases. Parmelee v. Lawrence, 44
I. 405 (1867).
"7 Byrd v. Crowder, 166 Tenn. 215, 60 S. W. 2d 171 (1933).
1" The practicing attorney should use great care in drafting an instrument which
is intended to be only a covenant not to sue in order to avoid a possible interpre-
tation by the court that it is an unqualified release of the claim for damages, and
to insure against the finding that it was executed in return for what the plaintiff
considered to be full compensation for the injury. The use of the word "release"
should be avoided lest it be given its technical connotation. Aiken v. Insull, 122
F. 2d 746 (7th Cir. 1941). And neither should all-inclusive language be employed.
Lisoski v. Anderson, 112 Mont. 112, 112 P. 2d 1055 (1941). It should be stated
in the instrument that the amount paid was not intended as an accord and satisfac-
tion of the entire claim for damages (Aljian v. Ben Schlossberg, Inc., 8 N. J. Super.
461, 73 A. 2d 290 (1950)) and that it was the intention of the parties that the
agreement be merely a covenant not to sue and not a release. Chicago & A. R.
Co. v. Averill, 224 Ill. 516, 79 N. E. 654 (1906). The agreement should contain a
reservation of a right of action against the remaining tort-feasor (Aljian v. Ben
Schlossberg, Inc., supra; Garbe v. Halloran, 150 Ohio St. 476, 83 N. E. 2d 217(1948)) and this reservation should be included in the same instrument. Natrona
Power Co. v. Clark, 31 Wyo, 284, 225 Pac. 586 (1924) (release discharges all
liability instantaneously) ; but see, Wright v. Fischer, 24 Tenn. App. 650, 148 S. W.
2d 49 (1940) (allowed supplementary agreement to vary original agreement).
S1I CODE FED. Rr~s. p. 1276 (Cum. Supp. 1943).
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or was threatened. Among the mines seized on that date were those
of the Pewee Coal Company, a Tennessee corporation, which subse-
quently sought to recover for a $36,128.96 operating loss sustained during
the period of Government possession. The Court of Claims awarded
$2,241.26, a sum representing that part of the loss found to have been
occasioned by the effectuation of a War Labor Board order granting
a fringe-wage increase to Pewee's employees.
2
In affirming, the Supreme Court (though splitting on the question
of compensation) unanimously agreed that there was a taking of the
respondent's property, pointing out that in United States v. United Mine
Workers of America3 they treated the seizure as making the mines
Government facilities "in as complete a sense as if the Government held
full title and ownership."4  It might be noted, however, that the Mine
Workers opinion concerned itself with the status of the employees, and
specifically refrained from expressing any conclusion as to the respective
powers and obligations of the Government and the operators during the
control period. 5 It is suggested, too, that the Executive Order did not
in itself constitute a taking since it was but a declaration of what could
be done if "necessary or desirable," 6 and that the measure of operational
control actually exercised by the Secretary was within the powers of
governmental regulation. 7 But the Government found itself in the some-
what awkward position of having to contend for no taking in a situation
where, to all outward appearances at least, a taking had been precisely
the objective sought to be attained ;s and this apparent anomaly, more
than theory or precedent, was probably the undoing of that contention.9
As to the compensability of such a taking, Justice Black10 argued,
2Pewee Coal Co. v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 426 (Ct. Cl. 1950) (one dissent).
330 U. S. 258 (1947).
'United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 71 Sup. Ct. 670, 671 (1951).
5330 U. S. 258, 288 (1947).
'And the "mere enactment of legislation which authorizes condemnation of
property cannot be a taking." Danforth v. United States, 308 U. S. 271, 286
(1939).
' Federal price controls do not involve a taking, Bowles, Price Adm'r v.
Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 517 (1944) ; nor war-time allocation of materials, St.
Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 831 (Ct. Cl. 1948), cert. denied, 335
U. S. 815 (1948) ; nor wage and hour controls, United States v. Darby, 312 U. S.
100 (1941) ; nor even forced cessation of mining operations, as a war measure,
Oro Fina Consol. Mines, Inc. v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 1016 (Ct. Cl. 1950),
cert. denied, 71 Sup. Ct. 1015 (1951).
' Besides the requirement of compliance with the WLB order, Government di-
rectives ordered the flying of the American flag, posting of the property, compliance
with OPA and safety regulations, continuance of the six-day week (evidently vol-
untary on Pewee's part), and certain reports to the Government. Respondent's
president was assigned to serve as "Operating Manager for the United States."
""If the Government was dishonest, if its priotestations were lacking in integrity,
what is there left in which we can place our trust?" Pewee Coal Co. v. United
States. 88 F. Supp. 426. 429 (Ct. Cl. 1950). See also United States v. Pewee
Coal Co., 71 Sup. Ct. 670, 671 (1951).10 With whom concurred Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, and Jackson.
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in the opinion of the Court, that the Government was responsible for
all losses suffered by Pewee during the seizure.11 Justice Reed con-
curred, but only to the extent of the award below, contending that the
Government should be responsible for only those losses occasioned by
its intervention. 12 The dissenting justices would have allowed no re-
covery, since they saw no proof of financial injury to the company.18
The dissenting opinion 14 represents a view which would leave upon
the plaintiff the burden of demonstrating that losses were suffered during
the seizure in excess of any which would have been sustained but for
that seizure. Such a view finds a measure of support in many cases.15
Justice Reed used language of similar import, but felt that the company
had successfully carried its burden by proving that there was a Govern-
ment act which (as he saw it) increased operating expenses unneces-
sarily. Both of these views purport to follow the general principle of
Marion & Rye Valley Ry. v. United States,16 the difference between
them running to questions of proof.17 The opinion of the Court, on the
other hand, apparently represents a departure from the theory of that
case, inasmuch as it is said to be enough that there were operating losses
and that the plaintiff sued for them-the crucial fact being that the
Government chose to intrude. In fashioning its argument the opinion
cited no precedent, but explained:
"When a private business is possessed and operated for public
use, no reason appears to justify imposition of losses sustained on
the person from whom the property was seized. This is concep-
tually distinct from the Government's obligation to pay fair corn-
"United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 71 Sup. Ct. 670, 672 (1951).1 Id. at 674 (concurring opinion).
" Id. at 674 (dissenting opinion).
"Together with the dissent below, Pewee Coal Co. v. United States, 88 F. Supp.
426, 431 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
15 E.g., United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338
U. S. 396, 406 (1949) ; United States v. John J. Felin & Co., 334 U. S. 624, 641
(1948); United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266, 273 (1943);
Westchester County Park Comm'n v. United States, 143 F. 2d 688, 692 (2nd Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 726 (1944).
""Nothing was recoverable as just compensation, because nothing of value was
taken from the company; and it was not subjected by the Government to pecuniary
loss." 270 U. S. 280, 282 (1926).
"'Wheelock Bros., Inc. v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 278 (Ct. Cl. 1950),
vacated on jurisdictioial grounds, 71 Sup. Ct. 730 (1951), involved the seizure of
motor carriers who had refused to comply with a WLB order. The suit was forjust compensation, and the Court of Claims award, as in the companion Pewee
case, was in the amount of increased wages. There the court admitted that it was
no% sure that the increase really occasioned a net loss to the company, since losses
might have been heavier absent seizure, but satisfied itself that the value of such
"speculation" was outweighed by the actual fact of an increased operational cost
ordered by the Government. This spells out one difference between Justice Reed
and the dissenters in the principal case. They also apparently disagreed as to the
necessity of proving the non-enforceability of WLB orders. As to the latter point
see NAToNAL WAR LARoR BOARD TERmiNATioN REPORT 415-424 (1946).
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pensation for property taken, although in cases raising the issue,
the Government's profit and loss experience may well be one
factor involved in computing reasonable compensation for a tem-
porary taking."18
Such a distinction, however, could create more problems than it solves,
because of its "heads I win and tails you lose" aspect,lO because it might
render seizures impractical in some cases, and because it could inspire
money-losing companies to solicit seizure.2 0 Furthermore, it would seem
more realistic to say that a company which has been seized as a national
defense measure should recover only resultant losses, rather than profit
from the transaction, at public expense, to the extent of recovering all
its other losses.2 1
In Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States22 it was held that the
proper measure of compensation for the temporary taking of a laundry
was the rental which probably could have been obtained plus an award
for damage to machinery and equipment in excess of ordinary wear and
tear. United States v. General Motors Corp.23 held, similarly, that the
condemnee was entitled to compensation for fixtures and permanent
equipment destroyed or 'depreciated in value by the taking, in addition
to the value of the occupancy. Accordingly, granted there was a taking,
it may be argued that an award to Pewee equivalent to the amount of
all losses could be justified as representing property destroyed during
the period of Government seizure.2 4 This contention, though not men-
tioned as such in the opinion, resembles that of Justice Black to the
effect that the "proprietor" should reap any profits and bear any losses.2 5
And it is submitted that the answer to both these propositions lies in
this distinction: in each of the two cited cases the Government appro-
priated and used the properties for its own purposes, that being the
very object of the seizure; while in the Pewee case the company was
allowed (with one exception) to operate as it saw fit, the object there
S United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 71 Sup. Ct. 670, 672 (1951).
" The condemnee (as here) would not have to bear losses but yet "might"
receive, in the calculation of conceptually distinct "fair compensation," the benefit
of a consideration of any profits made. This consideration, moreover, could be
the dominant one. Prince Line, Ltd. v. United States, 283 F. 535 (E. D. N. Y.
1922), writ of error dimissed, 263 U. S. 727 (1923).
"0 See Willcox and Landis, Goverginent Seizures in Labor Disputes, 34 CORNELL
L. Q. 155, 170-172 (1948).
21 Just compensation "must, of course, be just to the public as well as to the
owner." C. G. Blake Co. v. United States, 275 F. 861, 867 (S. D. Ohio 1921),
aff'd, 279 F. 71 (6th Cir. 1922). See also Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 574
(1897). It is submitted that this solicitude for the public welfare should obtain
regardless of conceptual distinctions.
"338 U. S. 1 (1949).
23 323 U. S. 373 (1945).
"Brief for Plaintiff, pp. 181-182, Pewee Coal Co. v. United States, 88 F. Supp.
426 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
"United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 71 Sup. Ct. 670, 672 (1951).
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being merely the continuation of operations. On the one hand an
offending, on the other an unoffending,26 sovereign. As Justice Reed
said: "The most reasonable solution is to award compensation to the
owner as determined by a court under all the circumstances of the
particular case."2 7'
Anderson v. Chesapeake Ferry Co. 28 is an interesting case to com-
pare with Pewee. It was a three-to-two decision to the effect that where
the Virginia Highway Commissioner seized temporarily the properties
of a strike-bound ferry, the fair rental value to which the company was
entitled was to be determined with reference to the value of the proper-
ties at the time of taking and their earning capacity under the circum-
stances at that time. Under this decision the State kept the profits,
since they represented, according to the majority, money made by virtue
of the "power of the State to quicken into action an idle enterprise"
which would have remained "idle and without any capacity to earn for
its owner except for the exercise of the State's authority."2 9 This is
cleariy speculation, paralleling the views of the dissents in both Pewee
cases, since no one can really know that the strikers would not have
been forced into submission had there been no seizure. However, the
opposing view, which is akin to the majority opinions in both cases, is
open to a similar accusation in that it insists upon treating the ferry
company as a "going concern" 3 0-thus disregarding the strike situation.
Which of the two ideas is preferable would seem to be a matter all too
susceptible of argument either way, but it may be mentioned, in passing,
that it would probably be hard to conceive of a union less likely to yield
to company pressure than the United Mine Workers.
Also of interest in the comparison of the Pewee and Anderson cases
is the role which labor-management considerations played, or may have
played, in the respective results. There is no doubt that such considera-
tions influenced the Virginia decision, since the majority opinion ob-
serves that if the company could take all the profits without assuming
operational risks "its willingness to take back its properties might not
arrive on winged feet."31  This decision may be said to award labor a
bargaining advantage, even though the right to strike was suspended,
inasmuch as wages were continued but company revenues practically
obliterated. Conversely, the dissent, in awarding profits as the correct
"Pewee's major losses apparently resulted from a combination of bad luck and
bad mining procedure. Pewee Coal Co. v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 426, 430
(Ct. Cl. 1950).
2"United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 71 Sup. Ct. 670, 673 (1951) (concurring
opinion).
2 186, Va. 481, 43 S. E. 2d 10 (1947).29 Id. at 489, 43 S. E. 2d at 15.
30Id. at 511, 43 S. E. 2d at 26.
" Id. at 499, 43 S. E. 2d at 20.
[Vol. 30
NOTES AND COMMENTS
measure of compensation, would have given the upper hand to manage-
ment, the authority of the State then becoming a hobble upon the bar-
gaining strength of labor. 32 In the Pewee case (involving, of course,
losses instead of profits) there was no discussion of bargaining powers,
but Justice Black would have given the advantage to management:
clearly, a company which is losing money as Pewee was33will have no
incentive to settle its -differences with the union so long as all its losses
are borne by someone else; more than that, such a decision would be a
strong incentive toward continuation of Government control, and might
even induce some companies to seek such control. The concurring
opinion (and the holding) does not offer asylum to the financially sick,
but it, too, does seem to favor management, since the company, upon
settlement, would accomplish nothing more than the assumption of
whatever increase was finally agreed upon. In either of these two situa-
tions, whether or not the employees were satisfied with their temporary
agreement would matter little or nothing to management, economically
speaking; but if they were satisfied then they also would have at least
no particular reason to strive for de-control, thus compounding the odds
against good-faith bargaining. Under the dissent's view, however, the
company would have had to pay everything, including the increase in
wages, and, consequently, the question of advantage to one side or the
other would seem to depend solely upon how satisfied each was with
the temporary settlement. It is submitted that this view is preferable
to either of the other two in respect of labor-management relations,
inasmuch as Government's place in that respect should be "in the middle"
-favoring, as nearly as possible, neither side.3 4
L. K. FuRGuRsoN, JR.
Liens-Subcontractors-Acquisition and Priorities
In 1874, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held, in Wilkie v.
Bray,1 that there was no right to a lien under the statute2 providing for
mechanic's, laborer's, or materialman's liens unless there was a contract
" For a discussion of this problem (which, however, apparently leaves open the
question of what is fair rental value under such circumstances) see Gerhart, Strikes
and Eminent Domain, 30 J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 116 (1946).
"Net loss for the period of seizure (May 1 to October 12, 1943) was $36,128.96.
""The greatest danger in the establishment of government seizure policy is
that the normal processes of collective bargaining will be disrupted. Crisis meas-
ures should be reserved for crisis problems, voluntary mediation for normal col-
lective bargaining. This implies two requirements: first, that voluntary mediation
machinery of the government should be perfected before emphasis is placed on
supplementary procedures; second, that seizure should not be permittd to be used
as an instrument of economic pressure by either management or labor." Teller,
Government Seizure in Labor Disputes, 60 HARv. L. REV. 1017, 1054 (1947).
71 N. C. 205 (1874).
N. C. Laws 1868-69, c. 206, §1, now, N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-1 (1950).
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with the owner creating the relationship of debtor and creditor.8 Con-
sequently, subcontractors were not able to enjoy the benefits of these
liens. Their contracts were not with the owner, but rather with the
principal contractor. In 1880,4 however, the General Assembly made
provision for a lien for subcontractors. 5
A subcontractor is one who has entered into a contract for the fur-
nishing of labor or material, or both, with the person who has already
contracted with the owner of the property for such labor or material. 6
There is no privity of contract between the subcontractor and the
property owner, nor does the relationship of debtor and creditor ever
arise between them.
When the subcontractor has furnished labor or material to his prin-
cipal contractor under the subcontract, the debtor-creditor relationship
arises between the subcontractor and the principal contractor. At this
point the subcontractor may be in a position to acquire his lien. Whether
or not this lien may be acquired depends on two things. First, there
must be a balance due on the contract between the owner and the prin-
cipal contractor.7 Second, there inust be notice given to the property
owner of the amount the principal contractor owes to the subcontractor.8
The requirement that a balance must be owing the principal con-
tractor by the owner is essential. The subcontractor cannot acquire a
lien on the property of the owner in excess of "the amount due the
original contractor at the time of notice given." As a direct conse-
quence of this, where the owner has paid the principal contractor in full
'Accord, Brown v. Ward, 221 N. C. 344, 20 S. E. 2d 324 (1942) ; Boykin v.
Logan, 203 N. C. 196, 165 S. E. 680 (1932) ; Charlotte Pipe and Foundry Co. v.Southern Aluminum Co., 172 N. C. 704, 90 S. E. 923 (1916) ; Weathers v. Borders,124 N. C. 610, 32 S. E. 881 (1899) ; Nicholson v. Nichols, 115 N. C. 200, 20 S. E.
294 (1894).
'N. C. Laws 1880, c. 44, §§1, 3.
IN. C. GEN. STAT. §44-6 (1950) "All subcontractors and laborers who are
employed to furnish or who do furnish labor or material for the building, repairing
or altering any house or other improvement on real estate, have a lien on saidhouse and real estate for the amount of such labor done or material furnished, ..
'Lester v. Houston, 101 N. C. 605, 8 S. E. 366 (1888).
'IN. C. GmE. STAT. §§44-6, 8, 9 (1950), Schnepp v. Richardson, 222 N. C. 228,
22 S. E. 2d 555 (1942); Rose v. Davis, 188 N. C. 355, 124 S. E. 576 (1942);
Charlotte Pipe and Foundry Co. v. Southern Aluminum Co., 172 N. C. 704, 90
S. E. 923 (1916); Blue Pearl Granite Co. v. Merchants Bank, 172 N. C. 354, 90
S. E. 312 (1916) ; Orinoco Supply Co. v. Masonic Home, 163 N. C. 513, 79 S. E.
964 (1913) ; Decker Bros. v. Flack, 152 N. C. 600, 68 S. E. 16 (1910).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §§44-8, 9 (1950). Schnepp v. Richardson, supra note 7;Norfolk Bldg. Supplies Co. v. Hospital Co., 176 N. C. 87, 97 S. E. 146 (1918);
Blue Pearl Granite Co. v. Merchants Bank, supra note 7; Borden Brick Co. v.
Pulley, 168 N. C. 371, 84 S. E. 513 (1915) ; Morganton Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 165
N. C. 285, 81 S. E. 418 (1914) ; Morganton Hardware Co. v. Graded Schools, 151N. C. 507, 66 S. E. 583 (1909); Clark v. Edwards, 119 N. C. 115, 25 S. E. 794(1896) ; Lookout Lumber Co. v. Mansion Hotel, 109 N. C. 658, 14 S. E. 35 (1891);
Pinkston v. Young, 104 N. C. 102, 10 S. E. 133 (1889).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-6 (1950).
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in advance, the subcontractor cannot acquire a lien 1°0 In connection
with this, it is to be noticed that a subsequent promise by the owner to
the subcontractor to pay the debt of the principal contractor is generally
without consideration.'" Also, it comes under the Statute of Frauds
requiring such a guaranty promise to be in writing.' 2  However, even
though at the time the notice is given to the owner there is nothing
owed by the owner to the principal contractor, any subsequent amount
due the principal contractor by the owner under the same contract is
subject to the lien of the subcontractor.'
In contrast with the liens for labor and materials as acquired by the
principal contractor, the subcontractor's lien does not have to be filed
publicly with the clerk of the superior court.' 4 However, a notice must
be served on the owner of the property. This notice may be given by
two methods. First, the principal contractor is required by law 15 to
furnish to the owner, before receiving any part of the contract price,
an itemized statement of the amount owing to any subcontractor. When
this notice is given the owner, a lien arises in favor of the subcontrac-
tor.1 6 Second, as a safeguard in the event the principal contractor fails
to give the above notice, the subcontractor may give notice in the form
of an itemized statement of the amount owed to him by the principal
contractor.17 When this is done, the lien is perfected. Either of these
notices, to be effectual in establishing the lien, must show the amount
owed by the principal contractor to particular subcontractors and the
specific work or materials for which the amount is due.' 8 A notice of
a general indebtedness of the principal contractor is not sufficient.19
Also, the mere fact that the owner is aware that certain people have
furnished labor or material is not sufficient 2 0
"Roberts & Johnson Lumber Co. v. Horton, 232 N. C. 419, 61 S. E. 2d 100
(1950) ; Dixon v. Ipock, 212 N. C. 363, 193 S. E. 392 (1937) ; Rose v. Davis, 188
N. C. 355, 124 S. E. 576 (1924) ; Orinoco Supply Co. v. Masonic Home, 163 N. C.
513, 79 S. E. 964 (1913); Decker Bros. v. Flack, 152 N. C. 600, 68 S. E. 16
(1910).(lRoberts & Johnson Lumber Co. v. Horton, supra note 10.
' N. C. GEN. STAT. §22-1 (1943) ; Roberts & Johnson Lumber Co. v. Horton,
232 N. C. 419, 61 S. E. 2d 100 (1950).
" Norfolk Bldg. Supplies Co. v. Hospital Co., 176 N. C. 87, 97 S. E. 146(1918); Blue Pearl Granite Co. v. Merchants Bank, 172 N. C. 354, 90 S. E. 312
(1916); Borden Brick Co. v. Pulley, 168 N. C. 371, 84 S. E. 513 (1915).14 N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-10 (1950) ; Blue Pearl Granite Co. v. Merchants Bank,
supra note 13; Morganton Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 165 N. C. 285, 81 S. E. 418
(1914).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §§44-8, 12 (1950).
"
0Economy Pumps, Inc. v. Woolworth Co., 220 N. C. 499, 17 S. E. 2d 639
(1941); Norfolk Bldg. Supplies Co. v. Hospital Co., 176 N. C. 87, 97 S. E. 146
(1918); Pinkston v. Young, 104 N. C. 102, 10 S. E. 133 (1889).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-9 (1950). See note 8 supra.1 8 Norfolk Bldg. Supplies Co. v. Hospital Co., 176 N. C. 87, 97 S. E. 146 (1918).
'L Ibid.
'
0 Ibid.; Clark v. Edwards, 119 N. C. 115, 25 S. E. 133 (1896).
1951]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Once the subcontractor has perfected his lien he is by substitution
entitled to the rights which the principal contractor could have ac-
quired.2 1 From this it follows that the relation back rule, applicable to
liens of principal contractors, 22 would apply, thereby making the lien of
the subcontractor effective as of the date of the first furnishing of mate-
rials or performance of labor.23 The lien acquired attaches to the full
extent of the owner's property on which the work was done or for which
materials were furnished. 24 However, the claim of the subcontractor
against the owner is limited. It cannot exceed the amount owed the
subcontractor by the principal contractor. Also it cannot, in any event,
exceed the amount owed by the owner to the principal contractor at the
time of the giving of the notice,25 nor the amount which may subse-
quently be owing to the principal contractor for additional performance
under the same contract.26
The subcontractor's lien is preferred over any lien which the princi-
pal contractor 27 might have acquired upon the property under the same
transaction 28 until the amount owed by the principal contractor to the
subcontractor is paid. 29 Until the subcontractor's lien has been dis-
charged, it enjoys the same position as to priority as against other credi-
tors of the owner as does a lien acquired by a principal contractor. 30
As between a number of subcontractors, each having acquired a lien,
working under the same principal contractor, there is no preference.
-" Schnepp v. Richardson, 222 N. C. 220, 22 S. E. 2d 555 (1942) ; Borden Brick
Co. v. Pulley, 168 N. C. 371, 84 S. E. 513 (1915).
-
2 Note, 29 N. C. L. Rxv. 480 (1951).
23 King v. Elliott, 197 N. C. 93, 147 S. E. 701 (1929) ; Harris v. Cheshire, 189
N. C. 219, 126 S. E. 593 (1925) ; McAdams v. Piedmont Trust Co., 167 N. C. 494,
83 S. E. 623 (1914); Clark v. Edwards, 119 N. C. 115, 25 S. E. 794 (1896);
McNeal Pipe and Foundry Co. v. Howland, 111 N. C. 615, 16 S. E. 857 (1892) ;
Lookout Lumber Co. v. Mansion Hotel, 109 N. C. 658, 14 S. E. 35 (1891); Burr
In..Maultsby, 99 N. C. 263, 6 S. E. 108 (1888) ; Chadbourn v. Williams, 71 N. C.
444 (1874) ; Warren v. Woodard, 70 N. C. 382 (1874).
- N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-6 (1950). See also Lanier v. Bell, 81 N. C. 337(1879).
23 N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-6 (1950). "The claim of the subcontractor or material-
man supplants that of the contractor and the duty of the owner to pay is an inde-
pendent and primary obligation created by statute. The owner is liable to the
subcontractor, however, only in the event he received notice of the claim prior to
the settlement with the principal contractor and then only to the extent of the un-
expended contract price still retained by him." Schnepp v. Richardson, 222 N. C.
228, 229, 22 S. E. 2d 555, 557 (1942) ; Widenhouse v. Russ, 234 N. C. 382,- S. E.
2d - (1951).
" Norfolk Bldg. Supplies Co. v. Hospital Co., 176 N. C. 87, 97 S. E. 146 (1918);
Blue Pearl Granite Co. v. Merchants Bank, 172 N. C. 354, 90 S. E. 312 (1916);
Borden Brick Co. v. Pulley, 168 N. C. 371, 84 S. E. 513 (1915).
" For a discussion of mechanic's, laborer's and materialman's liens as acquired
by principal contractors see Note, 29 N. C. L. REv. 480 (1951).2 N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-6 (1950); Lookout Lumber Co. v. Mansion Hotel, 109
N. C. 658, 14 S. E. 35 (1891) ; Lester v. Houston, 101 N. C. 605, 8 S. E. 366 (1888).
2 Lester v. Houston, supra note 28.30Note, 29 N. C. L. Rv. 480 (1951).
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Each is entitled to his pro rata share of the amount that the owner re-
tained, or should have retained, of the contract price owed to the prin-
cipal contractor at the time notice was given.3 1 Any payment made
by the owner to the principal contractor after the notice of the amount
due the subcontract'or from the principal contractor is given does not in
any way decrease the claim which the subcontractor may assert against
the owner.3 2
Should the owner refuse to retain the required amount of the con-
tract price after notice or if he should refuse to pay the same over to
the subcontractor, the subcontractor may proceed to enforce his lien.33
An action to enforce this lien is essentially the same in an action to
foreclose a mortgage on real property. Hence, the proper venue is in
the county in which the property is located.3 4 In suing to enforce the
lien against the owner, or rather his property, the subcontractor must
join as a party defendant the principal contractor as he is the primary
debtor. Until the subcontractor has established his claim against the
principal contractor he cannot maintain an action against the owner.3 5
Suit to enforce a subcontractor's lien must be brought within six
months from the time of the serving of notice on the owner.36 Failure
to bring suit within this period discharges the lien.37 In this event,
however, the subcontractor may nevertheless maintain a personal action
against the owner.38 This personal action is allowed on the theory that
the amount which the owner should have retained after the notice given
by the subcontractor is in the nature of a trust fund39 for the benefit of
the subcontractor.
Unfortunately, the decisions have left some of the aspects of lien
law as it pertains to subcontractors somewhat in doubt. An application
11 N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-11 (1950) ; Norfolk Bldg. Supplies Co. v. Hospital Co.,
176 N. C. 87, 97 S. E. 146 (1918) ; Charlotte Pipe and Foundry Co. v. Southern
Aluminum Co., 172 N. C. 704, 90 S. E. 923 (1916) ; Bond v. Pickett Cotton Mills,
166 N. C. 20, 81 S. E. 936 (1914) ; Morganton Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 165 N. C.
285, 81 S. E. 418 (1914) ; Hildebrand v. Vanderbilt, 147 N. C. 639, 61 S. E. 620(1908).
", N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-9 (1950) ; Lookout Lumber Co. v. Mansion Hotel, 109
N. C. 658, 14 S. E. 35 (1891).
"IN. C. GEN. STAT. §44-9 (1950).
"Penland v. Red Hill Methodist Church, 226 N. C. 171, 37 S. E. 2d 177(1946).
"Lookout Lumber Co. v. Mansion Hotel, 109 N. C. 658, 14 S. E. 35 (1891).
"IN. C. GEN. STAT. §44-43 (1950); Hildebrand v. Vanderbilt, 147 N. C. 639,
61 S, E. 620 (1908).
'7N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-48 (1950) Hildebrand v. Vanderbilt, supra note 36.
" Porter v. Case, 187 N. C. 629, 122 S. E. 483 (1924) ; Campbell v. Hall, 187
N. C. 464, 121 S. E. 761 (1924); Charlotte Pipe and Foundry Co. v. Southern
Aluminum Co., 172 N. C. 704, 90 S. E. 923 (1916); Hildebrand v. Vanderbilt,
147 N. C. 639, 61 S. E. 620 (1908).
" Norfolk Bldg. Supplies Co. v. Hospital Co., 176 N. C. 87, 97 S. E. 146 (1918);
Charlotte Pipe and Foundry Co. v. Southern Aluminum Co., supra note 38. Bond
v. Pickett Cotton Mills, 166 N. C. 20, 81 S. E. 936 (1914).
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of the present lien law to certain facts can produce some anomalous
situations. Suppose 0, the owner of certain property, contracted with
C for the building of a house. C commenced work on July 1. On
August 1, a mortgage executed by 0 to M was properly recorded. On
September 1, pursuant to a contract between S and C, S furnished
certain materials that were used in the finishing of the house. On
October 1, after the completion of the house, C filed notice of lien in
the office of the clerk of the superior court. On November 1, S, having
received no payment from C who in turn had received no payment from
0, gave sufficient notice to 0 of the amount due S by C. Since 0 had
become insolvent and his property was not of sufficient value to pay off
the three4" claims in full, the problem is which lien shall have priority.
As between C and M, by application of the rule of relation back to
the date of the initial furnishing of labor or materials, the mechanic's
lien of C is superior to the mortgage subsequently recorded.4 1 As be-
tween C's mechanic's lien and S's lien for material, S's lien is superior
being so preferred by the express words of the statute creating it.42 By
elementary logic it would seem to follow that S's lien would be superior
to M's mortgage. However, by close analysis and application of the
previously discussed principles of law, this result need not necessarily
follow.
The initial furnishing of materials by S was subsequent to the recorda-
tion of M's mortgage. The Supreme Court of North Carolina has held
that the relation back rule applies to liens of subcontractors. 43 Such
application fixes the effectiveness of S's lien at the time of the initial
furnishing of material. Consequently, if this theory is followed, S's
lien is subsequent and hence inferior to M's mortgage.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has also held that when the
subcontractor perfects his lien he is substituted to the rights of the
original contractor.4 4 If this is the case, C's lien being superior to the
mortgage, S's lien would be superior to the mortgage by substitution.
Suppose, however, instead of the above situation, M's mortgage,
having been recorded before any work was done, was clearly superior to
both C's lien and S's lien. Also, the value of the property had declined
to such an extent that it was sufficient only to pay off the claims of M
"o Though there are three claims against O's property, the total amount of these
claims is only the sum of M's claim and C's claim-S's claim being in amount a
part of C's claim.
'
1 Note, 29 N. C. L. REv. 480 (1951).
'
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-6 (1950); Lester v. Houston, 101 N. C. 605, 8 S. E.
366 (1888).
"' Clark v. Edwards, 119 N. C. 115, 25 S. E. 794 (1896) ; Lookout Lumber Co.




and S. The question arises as to whether or not S's lien for furnishing
materials can defeat O's homestead exemption.
The North Carolina Constitution4 5 provides that the mechanic's and
laborer's liens can defeat the homestead exemption; whereas, the ma-
terialman's lien being purely statutory cannot.46 C's lien is a mechanic's
lien and by express provision can defeat the homestead. S's lien is a
materialman's lien and being purely statutory cannot as such defeat the
homestead exemption. If S's lien is not allowed to defeat the homestead
exemption and C's lien is, S has lost his only security. This would
seem contrary to the established policy of protecting the rights of the
subcontractor as against the principal contractor. If, however, S's ma-
terialman's lien is substituted to the rights of C's mechanic's lien and
thus allowed to -defeat the homestead exemption, this would be promot-
ing a materialman's lien to the elevated status of a mechanic's lien in
law, though not in fact. Though this result may be desirable as pro-
tection for the subcontractor, it certainly should not be attained by
giving liens purely statutory the power to defeat rights conferred by the
Constitution.
A satisfactory solution of these problems under the existing lien law
is not apparent. 47 However, in the light of the possible confusion that
application of the existing lien law might produce, a constitutional
amendment protecting the subcontractor followed by a revision of our
lien law would seem desirable.
WILLIAM H. BOBBITT, JR.
Municipal Corporations-Tort Liability-Emergency Use of
Fire Department Inhalators
Traffic laws frequently exempt from their operation certain vehicles
engaged in public service emergencies 1 or give to such vehicles certain
rights of way over other vehicles on the streets and highways.2 Such
'IN. C. CoNsT. Art. X, §4.
"Cameron v. McDonald, 216 N. C. 712, 6 S. E. 2d 497 (1939) ; Broyhill v.
Gaither, 119 N. C. 443, 26 S. E. 31 (1896) ; Cumming v. Bloodworth, 87 N. C. 83(1882).
' The subcontractor's lien for materials would likely be held to be inferior to
the constitutionally created homestead rights. However, it is submitted that this
would not solve the problem.
I E.g, N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-145 (Supp. 1951): "The speed limitations set
forth ... shall not apply to vehicles ...of the police in the chase or apprehen-
sion of violators of the law . . . nor to fire department or patrol vehicles when
traveling in response to a fire alarm, nor to ...ambulances when traveling in
emergencies, nor to vehicles... [of the] Utilities Commission when... regulating
and checking ... traffic and speed. . . .This provision shall not, however, protect
the driver of any such vehicle from the consequence of a reckless disregard of the
safety of others."2IE.g., N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-156 (b) (1943): "The driver of a vehicle .
shall yield the right of way to police and fire department vehicles and public and
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special privileges do not, however, relieve the operator of such a vehicle
from the 'duty of exercising due care under the circumstances.
The application of such statutory special privileges was involved in
a recent New Mexico case.8 There a city employee, driving a city fire
truck in response to an emergency call for an inhalator, collided with
plaintiffs' automobile at an intersection. The facts as found by the
jury revealed that the plaintiffs, not having heard any warning, entered
the intersection slowly in response to a green light and were struck by
the fire truck, which, prior to applying its brakes fifty feet away, was
being driven fifty miles per hour against a red light. In an action for
damages, the court affirmed judgment against both defendant employee
and 'defendant city. The court held that a city fire truck responding to
a request for an inhalator was not "traveling in response to a fire alarm,"
nor was it an "ambulance" within the purview of a statute4 exempting
fire trucks and ambulances from speed limits when responding to fire
alarms and emergencies respectively. Neither was the fire truck being
operated upon "official business" within the meaning of a statute re-
quiring all vehicles to yield the right of way to police and fire department
vehicles when being operated "on official business and .. . sounding
audible signal." Therefore, the fire truck in responding to an emergency
call for an inhalator was not entitled to the special privileges granted
by the statutes.
No case has been found in which the North Carolina Supreme Court
has applied or interpreted sections 20-145 and 20-156 (b) of the General
Statutes.6 Furthermore, the principal case seems to be the first re-
corded decision in which a court has applied such statutes to a fire
department vehicle responding to an emergency call for an inhalator.
But in view of the increasingly extensive use of inhalators by the fire
departments of North Carolina, 7 an effort will be made to point out, in
the light of related decisions in this and other jurisdictions, the probable
alternatives open to the North Carolina courts if and when they are
confronted by the situation in the principal case.
private ambulances when the latter are operated upon official business and ...
sound audible signal .... This provision shall not operate to relieve the driver
... [of aforenamed vehicles] from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety
of all persons using the highways, nor shall it protect the driver . . .from 'the
consequence of any arbitrary exercise of such right of way."
'Tiedebohl v. Springer, 232 P. 2d 694 (N. M. 1951).
'N. M. STAT. ANN. §68-509 (1941). This statute is identical with the North
Carolina statute (see note 1 supa ) with the exception that no mention is made of
ambulances or utilities commission vehicles.
I N. M. STAT. ANN. §68-519 (1941). This statute is identical with the corre-
sponding North Carolina statute. See note 2 supra.
'See notes 1 and 2 supra.
' Eight out of ten fire departments interrogated are equipped with inhalators
which are available in emergency instances. The fire departments interrogated
are located in cities with a population of five to ten thousand.
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One court has described statutes strikingly similar to those of North
Carolina as "the power of the Legislature to determine what is or is not
negligence under the circumstances."'8 In applying such statutes, the
courts of California and Maryland have held, in effect, that the operator
of an emergency vehicle is not required to use the same care that the
law requires of the ordinary motorist.9 As for the civil liability of the
employee driver, it is probable that the North Carolina Court would, in
the light of its connective 'decisions,10 hold him personally liable to one
injured by his negligent operation of the fire truck; however, in the
language of our statutes, there must be shown "an arbitrary exercise
of the right of way" and "a reckless disregard for the safety of others."'"
Furthermore, in North Carolina, in order to make a traffic violation the
basis of a recovery for damages, the act complained of, though negligence
per se, must have been the proximate cause of the injury.'2
Apparently, the court in the principal case grounded the liability of
the city on a statute,13 but an attempt to impose a civil liability upon a
municipality in North Carolina under the circumstances of the principal
case would inevitably involve the issue of municipal tort immunity in
governmental functions.1 4  North Carolina is in accord with the weight
of authority in holding that the maintenance and operation of a fire
department is a governmental function, and that the municipality, in the
8 Lucus v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d 476, 60 P. 2d 1011 (1936) ; rehearing
denied, 75 P. 2d 599, 601 (1938).
' Isaacs v. City and County of San Francisco, 73 Cal. App. 2d 621, 167 P. 2d 221(1946) ("due regard" means that a driver should, by suitable warning, give others
a reasonable opportunity to yield right of way); Raynor v. City of Arcata, 11
Cal. 2d 113, 77 P. 2d 1054 (1938) ("arbitrary exercise" cannot be predicated upon
speed and failure to observe other rules of the road where warning has been
given); Baltimore Transit Co. v. Young, 189 Md. 428, 56 A. 2d 140 (1947) (or-
dinary care cannot be expected of one who is attempting to prevent public disaster).
" Lewis v. Hunter, 212 N. C. 504, 193 S. E. 814 (1937) (municipal employee
engaged in a governmental function held personally liable); Nissen v. City of
Winston-Salem, 206 N. C. 888, 175 S. E. 310 (1934) (municipal fireman held to
be an employee). See Note, 23 N. C. L. REV. 270 (1945).
11 See notes 1 and 2 supra.1 Wallace v. Longest, 226 N. C. 161, 37 S. E. 2d 112 (1946) ; Hobbs v. Coach
Co., 225 N. C. 323, 34 S. E. 2d 211 (1945); Morgan v. Carolina Coach Co., 225
N. C. 668, 36 S. E. 2d 263 (1945); Tarrant v. Bottling Co., 221 N. C. 390, 20
S. E. 2d 565 (1942). In each of these cases the violation of traffic regulations
was involved, and in each case the court held that, although the violation of the
statute involved was negligence per se, such negligence was actionable only if it
was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
11 N. M. STAT. ANN. §14-1611 (1941) provides that a municipal corporation
shall be liable for any act or tort done by any member or officer of the municipal
corporation, when done by the authority of or in the execution of orders of the
municipal corporation.
" The liability of a municipality in tort depends upon whether the act complained
of is characterized as governmental or proprietary. If governmental, there is no
liability unless imposed by statute; if proprietary, the municipality may be held
liable. Miller v. Wilson, 222 N. C. 340, 23 S. E. 2d 42 (1942) ; Parks v. Prince-
town, 217 N. C. 361, 8 S. E. 2d 217 (1940) ; Hodges v. Charlotte, 214 N. C. 737,
200 S. E. 889 (1938).
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absence of statutes to the contrary, is, therefore, not liable for injury
caused by the negligent operation of its fire department vehicles. 1'
The courts of some jurisdictions have limited the rule of governmental
immunity to the actual going to and returning from a fire, holding the
municipality liable when the fire trucks are being used for other pur-
poses.16 Other jurisdictions, on the other hand, have been more liberal
in spreading the cloak of "tort immunity" with regard to the operation
of fire vehicles.1 7 Although it seems that the principal case is in full
accord with the strict view in defining a "governmental function," in the
light of Lewis v. Hunter& it seems probable that North Carolina would
give a broader construction to the term, "governmental function." In
Lewis v. Hunter the court refused to hold a municipality liable for in-
juries negligently inflicted by a city mechanic while operating a police
car for the purpose of testing the radio. The court held that such was
a governmental function.19 Surely, with this case as a precedent, the
court might readily hold that the transportation of an inhalator in re-
sponse to an emergency call is a governmental function, and that the
municipality is, therefore, not liable for the negligent operation of the
fire trucks by its employee.
Nevertheless, in responding to emergency calls for inhalators, North
Carolina municipalities should be cognizant of the fact that the extent
of the statutory "exemptions" and "prior rights" applicable to fire de-
partment vehicles is, as interpreted in other jurisdictions, necessarily
tetermined by the terms of the grant.20 North Carolina statutes exempt
"Klussette v. Liggett Drug Co., 227 N. C. 353, 42 S. E. 2d 411 (1947) ; Mabe
v. City of Winston-Salem, 190 N. C. 486, 130 S. E. 2d 169 (1925).
For the weight of authority see Notes, 9 A. L. R. 143 (1920), 33 A. L. R.
690 (1924), 110 A. L. R. 1119 (1937) (cases collected on fire department as per-
taining to the governmental or proprietary branch of a municipality).
" Opocensky v. South Omaha, 101 Neb. 336, 163 N. W. 325 (1917) (court held
city liable on the ground that testing a fire truck was not a governmental func-
tion) ; Johnson v. Omaha, 108 Neb. 841, 188 N. W. 122 (1922) (court held city
liable on the grounds that driving fire truck from repair shop to station was not
a governmental function) ; Blagay v. Chicago, 290 Ill. App. 598, 7 N. E. 2d 934(1937) (court held city liable on the ground that hauling rocks into fire station
garden with fire truck was not a governmental function).
"T District of Columbia v. May, 68 F. 2d 755 (D. C. Cir. 1933), cert. denicd,
292 U. S. 630 (1933) (court held city not liable on ground that driving fire vehicle
to get equipment for fire box was a governmental function) ; Hooper v. Childress,
34 S. W. 2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) (negligently driving a truck on routinedrive and not in response to a fire call held a governmental function) ; Rollow v.
Ogden City, 66 Utah 475, 243 Pac. 791 (1926) (court held city not liable ongrounds that driving fire truck from substation to main station was a governmental
function).
"8212 N. C. 504, 193 S. E. 814 (1937).
11 Id. at 509, ". . . anything that he did for the city with the automobile in the
scope of his employment was done as an incident to the police power of the city-
a purely governmental function."
Schumacker v. City of Milwaukee, 209 Wis. 43, 243 N. W. 756 (1932)
. if such grant is general and unrestrictive, such vehicles are entitled to
assert their privileges at all times when in use for proper purposes) ; Audette v.
[Vol. 30
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fire trucks from speed limits when "traveling in response to a fire
alarm" and give them the right of way when "operated upon official
business." Query: is the scope of these statutes broad enough to cover
fire vehicles responding to emergency calls for inhalators?
In the light of the foregoing comments it would appear that the
following possibilities would confront the North Carolina courts in de-
termining the liability of a municipality for injuries negligently inflicted
by a fire truck while responding to a call for an inhalator:
(1) A fire vehicle engaged in this function comes within the purview
of G. S. 20-145 or G. S. 20-156(b), 2 1 and (a) such an engage-
ment is a governmental function, thereby not subjecting the
municipality to tort liability, unless (b) the municipality is in-
sured against such liability in accordance with North Carolina
statutes.-2
2
(2) A fire vehicle engaged in this function comes within the pur-
view of G. S. 20-145 or G. S. 20-156(b), but (a) such a func-
tion is not governmental, 23 and (b) the municipality is liable
for all injuries proximately resulting from the negligence of the
employee,24 notwithstanding the question of liability insurance.
(3) A fire vehicle engaged in this function does not come within
the purview of G. S. 20-145 or G. S. 20-156(b), and (a) such
a function is not governmental, and (b) the municipality is
liable for all injuries proximately resulting from the negligence
of the employee, notwithstanding the question of liability in-
surance.
Entirely apart from the issue of municipal liability, the stocking of
inhalators as a part of the emergency equipment of fire departments is
a development which should be recognized by courts as 'distinctly in the
New England Transp. Co., 71 R. I. 420, 46 A2d 570 (1946) ("... when the grant
is limited in terms, it must be so construed.").
"' It seems clear that a fire department vehicle delivering an inhalator is not
"traveling in response to a fire alarm" under G. S. 20-145. Neither does it seem
correct to designate such a vehicle an "ambulance" under G. S. 20-145. It would
seem correct to say that a fire department vehicle delivering an inhalator is "oper-
ated upon official business," under G. S. 20-156(b).
2'N. C. GEN. STAT. §§160-191.1 through 160-191.5 (Supp. 1951). These statutes,
enacted by the 1951 Legislature, provide that a municipality may, by properly in-
suring itself, waive its immunity from tort liability for the negligent operation of
its motor vehicles in governmental functions. Such waiver would be effective only
to the extent of the liability insurance in force. See Note, 29 N. C. L. REv. 421(1951).
"' See note 21 supra. Would not "official business" cover both governmental
and proprietary functions? If so, it could be reasoned that the special exemption
of G. S. 20-156(b) would apply even though the function is proprietary rather than
governmental.
"And under G. S. 20-156(b) it would be necessary to find an "arbitrary
exercise of ... right of way" in order to recover from either the individual or the
municipality.
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public interest. That there may also be a corresponding public interest,
perhaps even greater, in holding a municipality liable for the negligence
of its employees is merely to emphasize some of the undesirable conse-
quences of the traditional "municipal tort immunity idea." There is
good argument for the complete abolition of the "municipal tort im-
munity rule" so that a municipality would be subject to liability just as
any private employer.2 5 Abolition of this rule in North Carolina would
not subject a municipality to liability for the negligent operation of its
public service vehicles without regard to the emergency circumstances,
as there would still remain the ordinary application of statutory priv-
ileges to ascertain what standard of care a municipal employee is to be
held to in a given situation.
WILLIS D. BROWN.
Taxation-Gifts in Trust for Minors-Annual Exclusions
Section 1003 (b) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that
"In the case of gifts (other than gifts of future interests in property)
made to any person by the donor during the calendar year 1943 and
subsequent calendar years, the first $3,000 of such gifts to such person
shall not, for the purposes of subsection (a), be included in the total
amount of gifts made during such year."'
In determining what is a future interest within the meaning of sec-
tion 1003 (b) (3), primary emphasis is placed upon the "use, possession
and enjoyment" of the property rather than upon the vesting of the
property in the donee.2 The Regulations3 stipulate that "'Future in-
terests' is a legal term, and includes reversions, remainders, and other
interests or estates whether vested or contingent, and whether or not
2 Municipal tort immunity is an old subject of sharp attack. Green, Municipal
Liability for Tort, 38 ILm. L. REv. 126 (1944) ; Hobbs, The Tort Liability of
Municipalities, 27 VA. L. REV. 126 (1940) ; Warp, Can the "King" Do No Wrong?,
31 NAT. MUNIc. REv. 311 (1942) ; Notes, 14 N. C. L. Ry. 388 (1936), 22 N. Y.
U. L. Q. Rxv. 509 (1947), 24 VA. L. Rv. 86 (1937).
At least eight states (Cal., Ill., N. M., N. Y., Pa., S. C., W. Va., Wis.) im-
pose, by statute, civil liability upon municipalities for the negligent operation of
their motor vehicles in governmental functions.
Florida imposes liability on the municipality on the ground that reckless opera-
tion of its vehicles upon the streets constitutes a nuisance.
1 INT. REV. CODE §1003 (a) provides "The term 'net gifts' means the total
amount of gifts made during the calendar year, less the deductions provided in
section 1004."
'Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U. S. 18 (1945) ; United States v. Pelzer, 312
U. S. 399 (1941) ; Commissioner v. Glos, 123 F. 2d 548 (7th Cir. 1941).
U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, §86.11. This regulation further provides that "The
term has no reference to such contractual rights as exist in a bond, note (though
bearing no interest until maturity), or in a policy of life insurance, the obligations
of which are to be discharged by payments in the future. But a future interest
or interests in such contractual obligations may be created by the limitations con-
tained in a trust or other instrument of transfer employed in effecting the gift."
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supported by a particular interest or estate, which are limited to com-
mence in use, possession, or enjoyment at some future date or time."
Therefore, even though the donee's interest is vested, if he does not
also have the immediate right to the present enjoyment, use or posses-
sion of the property, the interest will be considered a future interest by
the court and the taxpayer will be denied the annual exclusion.4
The trust device is often utilized in making gifts to minors. At one
time there was some question as to whether the trust or the beneficiaries
of the trust were in fact the donees of the gift; however, it is now well
settled that the gift is to the beneficiaries and the taxpayer is entitled
to an annual exclusion for gifts made to each of them.5
If the donor wishes to employ the trust and still be able to take
advantage of the annual exclusion, many of the common trust provisions
must be eliminated. Provisions for the accumulation of income should
be avoided, for if the trustee is directed to accumulate income, the gift
is of a future interest and no annual exclusion is allowed. 6 This is true
even though the period of accumulation is as short as three months.7
If the trustee is directed to pay off existing encumbrances on the trust
property out of income, it is the same as if the trustee were directed
to accumulate income.8 Also, if the trustee is permitted in his discretion
to use some of the income for the support, education and maintenance
of the child and to accumulate the balance, the gift is considered as a
future interest; for whether or not any part of the income will be avail-
able for the benefit of the child depends upon the discretion of the
trustee.9 The presence of spendthrift provisions' o in the trust is not
sufficient to make the gift one of a future interest, 1 nor is the lack of
such provisions sufficient to create a present interest.' 2 A provision
'Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U. S. 442 (1945); Fondren.v. Commissioner,
324 U. S. 18 (1945) ; United States v. Knell, 149 F. 2d 331 (7th Cir. 1945) ; Com-
missioner v. Glos, 123 F. 2d 548 (7th Cir. 1941) ; Welch v. Paine, 120 F. 2d 141
(1st Cir. 1941) ; Estate of Ethel K. Childers, 10 T. C. 566 (1948).
'United States v. Pelzer, 312 U. S. 399 (1941); Helvering v. Hutchings, 312
U. S. 393 (1941).
Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U. S. 442 (1945) ; United States v. Pelzer, 312
U. S. 399 (1941) ; Hessenbruch v. Commissioner, 178 F. 2d 785 (3rd Cir. 1950) ;
United States v. Knell, 149 F. 2d 331 (7th Cir. 1945) ; Welch v. Paine, 120 F. 2d
141 (1st Cir. 1941).
7 Hessenbruch v. Commissioner, 178 F. 2d 785 (3rd Cir. 1950).
8 Commissioner v. Brandegee, 123 F. 2d 59 (1st Cir. 1941). In Mary R. Nelson
v. Commissioner, 46 B. T. A. 653 (1942), the court pointed out that the gift could
be shown to be a present gift by proving that no encumbrances existed on the
property which would postpone the unqualified right to the income.
D United States v. Knell, 149 F. 2d 331 (7th Cir. 1945) ; Hutchings-Sealy Nat'l
Bank v. Commissioner, 141 F. 2d 422 (5th Cir. 1944); Commissioner v. Taylor,
122 F. 2d 714 (7th Cir. 1941) ; Estate of Ethel K. Childers, 10 T. C. 566 (1948).
10 Generally speaking such provisions prohibit the beneficiary from alienating
his interest or anticipating or assigning the income.
11 Charles v. Hassett, 43 F. Supp. 432, 434 (D. Mass. 1942).12 Welch v. Paine, 120 F. 2d 141, 143 (1st Cir. 1941).
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giving the beneficiaries the right to the use of the principal upon their
joint request has been held to create a future interest, the contingency
being that they both join in the exercise of the power.' 3 In another
case,' 4 the trustee was 'directed to use the income necessary for the
support, education and comfort of the minors, and the court held that
the gift was a future interest unless there was some indication from the
face of the trust or surrounding circumstances that a steady flow of
some ascertainable portion of income would be required.
If the donor wishes to take advantage of the annual exclusion, he
should be sure that the trust is so drafted that the value of the gift is
capable of determination. 15 For instance, if there is a present gift of
income and the trustee, in his discretion, can use the principal for the
benefit of the beneficiaries, the value of the gift of the income cannot be
determined, for if and when the trustee does invade the corpus, the pay-
ments of the income will be proportionately reduced. This potential
invasion of principal makes the value of the gift of the income unascer-
tainable and the annual exclusion will be denied.' 6
On the other hand, where the trustee is directed to make periodic
payments of all or some definite part of the income to the minors, the
gift is treated as one of a present interest and the annual exclusion is
permitted to that extent.' 7 The dates of distribution of income do not
have to be definite so long as the distribution is directed to be made at
least annually, and the requirement that the minor be living at the date
of distribution of income does not prevent the gift from being one of a
present interest.' 8
In a recent federal case arising in North Carolina,' 9 the taxpayer
created an irrevocable trust for her four-year-old grandson. The trust
provided that the beneficiary was to be paid all the income until he
reached the age of twenty-one. The trustees were also directed to use
for the support of the child such amounts, of the principal as might be
" Ryerson v. United States, 312 U. S. 405 (1941).
"United States v. Disston, 325 U. S..442 (1945).
SIn Helvering v. Blair, 121 F. 2d 945 (2nd Cir. 1941), the trustees were
authorized to apportion income among the beneficiaries as they saw fit, and this
authority rendered the computation of the value of any beneficiaries' share im-
possible, and the annual exclusion was denied. But see Commissioner v. Lowden,
131 F. 2d 127, 128 (7th Cir. 1942), where the court remarks that "To constitute a
future interest mere uncertainty of amount must be co-existent with restrictions
upon or postponement of immediate use and enjoyment."
" Andrew Geller v. Commissioner, 9 T. C. 484 (1947) ; Margaret A. C. Ritter
v. Commissioner, 3 T. C. 301 (1944). In Kniep v. Commissioner, 172 F. 2d 755
(8th Cir. 1949), there was a present gift of income but the trustee could, in his
discretion, encroach upon the principal to the extent of $1,000 per year for each
beneficiary. The court pointed out that the beneficiary could only be certain of
receiving income from principal which had been reduced to this extent.
17 Commissioner v. Sharp, 153 F. 2d 163 (9th Cir. 1946).
" Alfred D. Edwards v. Commissioner, 46 B. T. A. 815 (1942).
9 Cannon v. Robertson, 98 F. Supp. 331 (W. D. N. C. 1951).
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directed by the court vested with jurisdiction of the person or the estate
of the child during minority, to the same extent as if the trustees were
the duly appointed guardians of the child's estate. The court, in holding
that this was a gift of a present interest, pointed out that the trust made
the same provisions which would have applied under North Carolina
law if the gifts had been made outright to the minor and a guardian of
the estate had been appointed.20 In another recenf .case,21 the terms
of the trust provided that it could be terminated when the beneficiary or
his legally appointed guardian should make due 'demand in.writing. Al-
though the minor was incapable of making a legal demand and there was
no indication that a guardian would be appointed even if requested,22
the gift was considered one of a present interest. The court of appeals
stated, "As heretofore shown, the fallaciousness of the Commissioner's
contention is the failure to distinguish between restrictions and con-
tingencies imposed by the donor (in this case the trust instrument).and
such restrictions and contingencies as are due to disabilities always in-
cident to and associated with minors and other incompetents. As to the
former it is authoritatively settled that a gift upon which the donor
imposes such conditions or restrictions is of a future interest. In the
latter such restrictions as exist are imposed by law due to the fact that
the beneficiary is incapable of acting on his own. It is our view, and
we so hold, that such restrictions do not transform what otherwise would
be a gift of a present interest to one of a future interest."2 3 A similar
decision was reached in the Strekalovsky case 24 where the trust provided
that upon demand of any legally appointed guardian of any of the chil-
dren, the entire share was to be paid to the guardian.
Evidently, these decisions were influenced by a dictum in Fondren
v. Commissioner25 where the petitioner contended that unless the gifts
were held to be present interests, then no gift to a minor could be so
regarded, since someone had to exercise discretion as to the necessity
and reasonable requirements of the beneficiary. The court held that the
gifts were future interests but pointed out that it did not follow that all
gifts to minors would b6 so treated. It further said that the petitioner's
argument was appealing to the extent that it sought to avoid imputing
to Congress the intention to penalize gifts to minors solely because of
their legal tiisabilities,26 and indicated that whenever provisions were
20 Id. at 333.
"Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F. 2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951).
2This point was brought out in the Tax Court's decision which held that the
gifts were future interests. 15 T. C. 111 (1950).
" Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, supra at 122.Strekalovsky v. Delaney, 78 F. Supp. 556 (D. Mass. 1948).
23324 U. S. 18, 29 (1945).
"When this case was in the court of appeals, Judge Waller, in a dissenting
opinion, remarked "I hesitate to ascribe to Congress the absurd design to tax a
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made for the immediate application of the gift for the benefit of the minor
the exclusion would be allowed.
On the basis of these cases it seems that the taxpayer can make a
present gift of the corpus or income of a trust to a minor2 by subjecting
the trustee to the same restrictions as would be imposed upon the guar-
dian of the minor's estate by operation of law.2& However, until the
matter is finally settled by the United States Supreme Court, the Com-
missioner might continue to assert that such gifts to persons under
disability are prima facie taxable and subject the taxpayer to a deficiency
assessment.29 Whether or not it would be advisable to employ the trust
in making gifts to minors under such circumstances seems -debatable.3 0
Nevertheless, if the settlor can in effect appoint the trustee as guardian
of the estateSl it is plausible that the benefits to be derived from the
trusteeship would justify the risk of a possible deficiency assessment.3 2
THOMAS M. MoORE.
Workmen's Compensation-Constitutional Law-Heart
Disease as an Occupational Disease
In 1949 the North Carolina General Assembly adopted an amend-
ment to the Workmen's Compensation Act which provided that certain
heart diseases would be deemed occupational diseases for firemen.' The
gift to a babe in arms because his estate must be managed by some one sui juris,
exercising the powers of a guardian or parent, while a gift to an adult, requiring
no managing third party, is tax free. Congress likes adult voters, but surely not
that well" 141 F. 2d 419, 422 (5th Cir. 1944).
27 However, if the donor of the trust is legally obligated to support the bene-
ficiary, then to the extent that the income of the trust is applied to the support or
maintenance of the beneficiary, it will be treated as the income of the donor under
INT. REv. CoDE §167 (c). In Wallace Townsend, Exr. v. Thompson, CCH FEDERAL
ESTATE AND Gnr TAX REPoRTEm 10,780 (D. C. Ark. 1950), where the donor-
trustee, who was the father of the child beneficiary, died before the minor attained
majority, the court held that the corpus of the trust was to be included in the
donor's estate.
8 Fleming, Gifts for the Benefits of Minors, 49 MicE. L. REv. 529, 539 (1951).
"The administration of the tax laws should be practical, so the argument runs, and
a practical administration of the present interest test should regard the rights,
controls, and enjoyment of the guardian as that of the minor."2" Anderson, Gifts to Children and Incompetents, 26 TAXES 911, 916 (1948).
" Drexler, The Exclusion Provision of the Gift Tax Law Needs Amending, 29
TAXES 743, 747 (1951), ". . . in many instances where the trust device continues
to be employed, such as in the Strekalovsky and Kieckhefer cases, it has caused
the basic provisions of the trust to be so fundamentally altered that it hardly con-
stitutes a trust at all, as the term is traditionally understood."
"
1 Cannon v. Roberson, 98 F. Supp. 331 (W. D. N. C. 1951).
"
2 As a practical matter, it seems that the donor could make a gift directly to
the minor and then attempt to have someone who is in accord with his views ap-
pointed as guardian.
1 IN. C. GEN. STAT. §97-53(26) (1950) : "In case of members of fire departments
of cities, counties or municipal corporations or political subdivisions of the state,
whether such members are voluntary, partly paid or fully paid; coronary throm-
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first case arising under this statute was just recently decided. A fireman
died as the result of coronary occlusion while upon his vacation and the
commission made an award to his widow based upon the statute. The
North Carolina Supreme Court held that the statute was in violation of
the constitutional provision barring special emoluments2 and reversed
the decision of the lower court which had affirmed the commission's
award.
The court repeated a statement made in a prior case that "heart
'disease is not an occupational disease."4  In that case a game warden
died from coronary occlusion shortly after having trouble arresting some
game law violators, and denial of compensation by the commission
was sustained. The court's view that heart disease is not an occupa-
tional disease is supported by decisions in several other states.5
At the time of the enactment of Section 97-53(26) of the General
Statutes, North Carolina joined Minnesota and California as the only
states with statutes listing heart disease as an occupational disease for
firemen.6 Florida joined this group in the spring of this year.7 Min-
nesota is the only other state which has had a case on the statute to
bosis, coronary occlusion, angina pectoris, or acute coronary insufficiency shall
each be deemed to be an occupational disease within the meaning of this article,
provided:
"(a) Such disease develops or first manifests itself during a period while such
member is an active member of such department or unit.
"(b) Said member, prior to such manifestation or development, shall have
served five consecutive years or more immediately preceding such manifestation or
development as an active member of said fire service and
"(c) Said member upon entering said fire service or not less than five years
prior to first manifestation or development of said heart disease, shall have under-
gone a medical examination, which examination failed to disclose the presence of
such disease.
"(d) Cities may adopt their own plans for the purpose of carrying out the in-
tent of this subsection.
"For the purpose of the foregoing, the time of development or first manifesta-
tion of such disease shall only be determined by and run from the date of first
notice of the existence of such diseases to such member by a physician or the date
of death as a result of such diseases.!2 N. C. CoNsT. ART. I, §7: "No man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or
separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of pub-
lic services."
Duncan v. City of Charlotte, 234 N. C. 86, 66 S. E. 2d 22 (1951).
'West v. N. C. Dept. of Conservation, 229 N. C. 232, 49 S. E. 2d 398 (1948).
'Lohndorf v. Pepper Bros. Paint Co., 135 N. J. L. 352, 52 A. 2d 61 (1947)(manager of paint store died of coronary occlusion while engaged in regular
work); Jones v. Remington Arms Co., 209 S. W. 2d 156 (Kan. 1948) (machine
operator in factory suffered heart attack while engaged in regular work) ; Cooper
v. Vintieri, 43 N. W. 2d 747 (S. D. 1950) (laborer died from heart disease while
doing usual work) ; Nickelberry v. Ritchie Grocery Co., 196 La. 1011, 200 So. 330
(1941) (while performing usual tasks laborer developed heart disease).
' CALIF. CODE ANiN. §3212 (1950) (statutes of California also cover policemen,
fire wardens, and state patrolmen) ; MASON'S MINN. ST. Sr'F. §4327(9) (1940).
" The Florida Legislature passed a bill providing coverage for fireman from
tuberculosis, hypertension, and heart disease at the last session on May 31, 1951.
See Vol. 8, BurEAu OF LABOR STANDARDS LEGiSLATnm REPORT, June 15, 1951.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
reach the highest court and its holding was contra to that of the North
Carolina court.8 Minnesota has a constitutional prohibition against
special legislation very similar to that of North Carolina, 9 but the Min-
nesota court did not find that the statute violated it."° That court held
that there was enough evidence to support the legislative designation of
heart disease as an occupational disease for firemen.' The North
Carolina Supreme Court, which seems to take a less liberal view of
workmen's compensation, thought that the medical testimony failed to
show that heart disease was so related to the work of firemen as to
classify it as an occupational disease for that group. 12
The 'difference between the decisions of the two courts seems to lie
in the liberality of construction of the special privilege clause of the
respective constitutions. The North Carolina Supreme Court would
require a very convincing basis for the creation of any class such as the
firemen in this case, while the Minnesota court goes along with the
legislature so long as it is not shown that the legislature acted purely
arbitrarily in establishing the class.' 3 In view of the vagueness of the
constitutional provisions, each decision as a matter of judicial interpre-
tation can be justified. However, the effect of the Minnesota decision
has been severely weakened by a recent amendment to the occupational
disease statute which abolished the presumption that any of the enu-
merated diseases are occupational diseases in any given case.' 4 Under
Minnesota law as it now stands the claimant must show that the heart
disease arose out of or in the course of the employment.1
In examining the testimony in both the Minnesota and North Caro-
S Kellerman v. City of St. Paul, 211 Minn. 351, 356, 1 N. W. 2d S78, 380 (1941):
"The Statute is undoubtedly constitutional."
I MINN. CoNsT. ART. 4, §33: "The legislature shall pass no local or special law
... granting to any corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive
privilege, immunity or franchise whatever or authorizing public taxation for a
private purpose'
'0 "Legislation in its very nature involves classification and a statute will be
held unconstitutional on that ground only where the class it necessarily establishes
has no substantial basis in fact." Kellerman v. City of St. Paul, 211 Minn. 351,
355, 1 N. W. 2d 378, 380 (1941).
"Id. at 355, 1 N. W. 2d at 380 "The apparent high percentage of occurrence
of conorary sclerosis among firemen demonstrates that the legislature was not
arbitrary in providing for them as a class."
2 "The record in the instant case reflects no evidence that the fatal heart attack
suffered by the deceased was in fact an occupational disease or that it was pro-
duced by his employment as a fireman." Duncan v. Charlotte, 234 N. C. 86, 92,
66 S. E. 2d 22, 26 (1951).
x See note 10 sup ra.
"Prior legislative enumeration of occupational disease shall not entitle any
employee afflicted with such disease to a presumption that the same is in fact an
occupational disease." MINN. STAT. ANN. §176.66 (1949) (statute enacted 1943).
1" Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555, 18 N. W. 2d 535 (1945). See Riesen-
feld Forty Years of Workmen's Compenwation, 35 MINN. L. REv. 525, 539 (1951) :
"Even the Supreme Court of Minnesota, usually in line with the progressive courts,
still looks for extraordinary exertion in case of heart failure."
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lina cases it becomes evident that the causes and aggravating factors of
heart disease are something about which little is known. The medical
experts were in conflict as to the causes' 6 and only one doctor in either
group would make any definite statement on the subject. 17 The chief
basis for classifying heart disease as an occupational disease for firemen
is statistical,' 8 and the statistics available are incomplete.
The underlying conflict involved in these cases might be explained
by differing views as to the basic theory of workmen's compensation.
If it is social insurance as contended by some,19 then the heart disease
statute should include all workers covered by the act. If it is insurance
against purely industrial accidents and occupational diseases as set forth
by the North Carolina court,20 then there must be a stronger basis for
singling out firemen for protection. It would seem that the North
Carolina Legislature has the clear power to enlarge the occupational
disease provisions, 21 but to arbitrarily single out a special group for
substantial benefits is not permitted by the constitution.
The enactment of Section 97-53(26) of the General Statutes seems
to have been too far ahead of medical science and such legislation must
await further medical knowledge unless the North Carolina basic con-
cept of an occupational 'disease is drastically altered.22
COLVIN T. LEONARD, JR.
1" Kellerman v. City of St. Paul, 211 Minn. 351, 355, 1 N. W. 2d 375, 380
(1941): "The medical witnesses for the relator . . . testified in substance that
coronary sclerosis is not more prevalent among firemen than among other occupa-
tions and that Kellerman's work had no effect upon his coronary sclerosis." Two
other doctors testified that the work of a fireman would contribute to the injury.
Brief for appellant, p. 7, Duncan v. Charlotte, 234 N. C. 86, 66 S. E. 2d 22 (1951) :
Dr. Robert L. McMillan, an expert in heart ailments at Bowman Gray Medical
School appeared for claimant. Dr. McMillan testified that medical opinion is not
certain whether or not tension is a contributing factor in the development of the
coronary diseases. He further testified that he had no opinion as to whether or
not the deceased employee's death was brought about by his employment as a
fireman.
"'Kellerman v. City of St. Paul, 211 Minn. 351, 355, 1 N. W. 2d 375, 380(1941). An article by Dr. Harry L. Smith of the Mayo Clinic stated that occu-
pation did have an effect on the incidence of coronary sclerosis. See also Boas,
Trauma and Heart Disease, 2 NAccA L. JOURNAL 113 (1948).
"' Kellerman v. City of St. Paul, 211 Minn. 351, 354, 1 N. W. 2d 375, 380:
"The medical experts were in complete accord that the cause of coronary sclerosis
is unknown, and that the only practical way to determine whether it is due to the
nature of the employment, in view of the present status of medical knowledge on
the subject, would be to test its incidence in different occupational groups.'
10 See Riesenfeld, mspra note 15, at 525.
20 The rule bf causal relation is the very sheet anchor of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. It has kept the Act within the limits of its intended scope, that of
providing compensation benefits for industrial injuries, rather than branching out
into the field of general health insurance benefits. Vause v. Equipment Co., 233
N. C. 88, 92, 63 S. E. 2d 173, 176 (1950).
2 "The State Legislature is justified in extending the benefits of the compensa-
tion law as far as it may reasonably determine occupational hazard to -extend. ..
58 A!. JUR. 641.221 SCHNEIDER, WORKM I'S COiPENSAnIoN 644 (2d ed.): "A disease con-
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Zoning Ordinances-Estoppel of Municipality to Enforce
The City of Raleigh had allowed the defendant to conduct a business
in her home (located in a residential zone) for a long period of time.
Although the building inspector had issued four different permits for
improvements or additions with the knowledge that the zoning ordinance
was not being observed and that the tax collector had collected a privi-
lege license tax (bakery) for eight years, the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that the city was not estopped to enforce its zoning ordinance,
and sustained an injunction requiring the defendant to conform.'
In enacting and enforcing zoning ordinances, the municipality is
exercising the police power of the state.2 A few courts have held that
a municipality is estopped from revoking a permit issued in violation of
its zoning ordinance if the permittee has acted in good faith and has
incurred expense in reliance on the permit. For instance, one court
used language which flatly announced that the doctrine of estoppel
applied to a city in the same manner as to an individual or corporation.3
Another decided that to permit the city to revoke a permit would un-
justly and inequitably deprive the permittee of rights which the city had
granted to him.4 Some courts, faced with unique fact situations, have
held that the enforcement of the zoning law would deprive the permittee
of a vested property interest which is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.5
However, by the majority view, a municipality when exercising gov-
ernmental functions cannot be estopped from enforcing its laws by un-
authorized or illegal acts of its officers or agents.0 Every person who
obtains and expends money in reliance on a building permit issued by
an a gent, of the municipality is charged with knowledge of the zoning
tracted in the usual and ordinary course of events, which from the common ex-
perience of humanity is known to be incidental to a particular employment is an
occupational disease. . . ." Quoted with approval in Duncan v. City of Charlotte,
234 N. C. 86, 91, 66 S. E. 2d 22, 26 (1951) and McNeely v. Carolina Asbestos Co.,
206 N. C. 568, 572, 174 S. E. 509, 511 (1923).
' 
1 Raleigh v. Fisher, 232 N. C. 629, 61 S. E. 2d 897 (1950).
'Kinney v. Sutton, 230 N. C. 404, 53 S. E. 2d 306 (1949).
"RoseUthal v. Dallas, 211 S. W. 2d 279 (Texas Civ. App. 1948), 28 TExAs L.
REV. 125. (1949). -
"District of Columbia v. Cahill, 54 F. 2d 453 (D. C. Cir. 1931).
'Evansville v. Gaseteria, Inc., 51 F. 2d 232 (7th Cir. 1931), Trans-Oceanic Oil
Corp. v. Santa Barbara, 85 Cal. App. 2d 776, 194 P. 2d 148 (1948).
0 Magiuder v. Redwood City, 203 Cal. 665, 265 Pac. 806 (1928); Gordon v.Surfside, 150Fla. 614, 8 So. 2d 497 (1942) ; Lipsitz v. Parr, 164 Md. 222, 164 Atl.
743 (1933) ; S. B. Garage Corp. v. Murdock, 185 Misc. 55, 55 N. Y. S. 2d 456 (Sup.
Ct. 1945). Cf. Henderson v. Gill, 229 N. C. 313, 49 S. E. 2d 754 (1948) (state not
estopped to collect taxes); Jenkins v. Henderson, 214 N. C. 244, 199 S. E. 37(1938) (city not estopped to assert ultra vires contract was void) ; State v. Bevers,86 N. C. 588 (1882) (estoppel cannot be set up against the state, but the truth of
any transaction undertaken in its name may be shown); 23 WAsir. L. REv. 51(1948). -
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ordinance and that the agent has no authority to disobey or disregard
it.7 A building permit which is issued in violation of the zoning ordi-
nance is void ab initio8 and there can be no property rights acquired by
making expenditures in reliance on it.o
The fact that the permittee and the municipal agent have both acted
in good faith has no bearing on the result,1 0 nor does a certification by
the proper agent that the proposed or existing structure is not in viola-
tion of the zoning regulations." A mistake of fact' 2 or an error of a
clerk' 3 in issuing a permit does not estop the municipality from later
asserting that the structure does not conform to zoning regulations.
However, the violation must be an actual one and not merely an antici-
pated one.' 4  Obviously, if there has been fraud, misrepresentation' 5
or concealment 16 in the application for the permit, the municipality is
not estopped from enforcing the zoning regulations when the truth is
discovered. A resolution by the governing body of the municipality that
it will not enforce its zoning regulations will not act to estop the munici-
pality from later enforcing the zoning laws.17 Even though the officers
of the municipality knew at the time the permit was issued that the appli-
cant intended to violate the zoning law, there is no estoppel against the
municipality.' 8 Merely because the municipality has allowed a continued
violation's or has allowed others to violate the zoning ordinance 'does
not estop it from proceeding against a particular violator.2 0
It seems to be well established in North Carolina that the payment.
7 Idaho Falls v. Grimmett, 63 Idaho 90, 117 P. 2d 461 (1941).
'Giordano v. Dumont, 137 N. J. L. 740, 61 A. 2d 245 (1948).
'S. B. Garage Corp. v. Murdock, 185 Misc. 55, 55 N. Y. S. 2d 456 (Sup. Ct.
1945).
lo W. H. Barber Co. v. Minneapolis, 227 Minn. 77, 34 N. W. 2d 710 (1948).
Lipsitz v. Parr, 164 Md. 222, 164 Atl. 743 (1933).
12 Godson v. Surfside, 150 Fla. 614, 8 So. 2d 497 (1942) (enunciates the general
rule). Contra: District of Columbia v. Cahill, 54 F. 2d 453 (D. C. Cir. 1931).
" Lipsitz v. Parr, 164 Md. 222, 164 Atl. 743 (1933).
14 Mitchell v. Barfield, 232 N. C. 325, 59 S. E. 2d 810 (1950); Pendleton v.
Columbia, 209 S. C. 394, 40 S. E. 2d 499 (1946).
1" Godson v. Surfside, 150 Fla. 614, 8 So. 2d 497 (1942).
1" Valicenti's Appeal, 298 Pa. 276, 148 Atl. 308 (1929).
2 7 Maguire v. Reardon, 41 Cal. App. 596, 183 Pac. 303 (1919), affd 255 U. S.
271 (1921) ; Snow v. Johnson, 197 Ga. 146, 28 S. E. 2d 270 (1943).
' Magruder v. Redwood City, 203 Call. 665, 265 Pac. 806 (1928).
19 Leigh v. Wichita, 148 Kan. 607, 83 P. 2d 644 (1938).
-" Valicenti's Appeal, 298 Pa. 276, 148 AtI. 308 (1929). However, in one case
where the zoning ordinance was apparently directed at a single party and where the
municipality allowed violations of a similar character by others before and after
proceeding against the defendant, the court held that it would be a denial of the
equal protection of the laws to allow the municipality to enforce the ordinance
against the defendant. Evansville v. Gaseteria, Inc., 51 F. 2d 232 (7th Cir. 1931).
Where the zoning ordinance was ambiguous and provided that the building inspec-
tor should determine whether the use conforms to the ordinance, it was held that
the municipality could not revoke a permit issued by such an agent unless his
action was clearly erroneous or without basis. Crow v. Board of Adjustment of
Iowa City, 227 Iowa 324, 288 N. W. 145 (1939), 25 IowA L. REv. 383 (1940).
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of a privilege license tax only gives authority to exercise that privilege
in a lawful manner, and that the payment of a privilege license tax will
not estop the state from prosecuting those who violate its laws.2 1
Municipalities in North Carolina are given authority by the General
Assembly to enact zoning ordinances. 22 The method of making changes
in the several zones, once established, is also set out by the statute. A
holding by the court that the municipality is estopped from enforcing
its zoning ordinance by the acts of its agents would have the effect of
allowing the zoning ordinance to be amended by circumvention. It is
submitted that the decision of the court in the principal case is sound.
ERNEST S. DELANEY, JR.
State v. Calcutt, 219 N. C. 545, 15 S. E. 2d 9 (1941) (license issued by the
state revenue department does not authorize violation of the slot machine law);
Hinkle v. Scott, 211 N. C. 680, 191 S. E. 512 (1937) (payment of state and county
license tax on slot machines would not justify the operation of those devices, if
unlawful).
-'N. C. GEN. STAT. §160-172 (1943).
